Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Action by McGarity, Thomas O.
[Vol. 129:302
MULTI-PARTY FORUM SHOPPING FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
THOMAS 0. MCGARITY t
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. FORUM SHOPPING-AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM ....... 307
A. Varieties of Forum Shopping .................... 307
B. The Policies For and Against Forum Shopping ..... 312
1. Disadvantages of Forum Shopping .............. 312
a. Public Image of Lawyers and Courts ......... 312
b. Judicial Comity ........................... 313
c. Uniform Application of Agency Policy ....... 314
d. Business Uncertainty ...................... 317
e. Costs of Forum Shopping ................... 318
2. The Advantages of Forum Shopping ............ 318
II. CURRENT PRACTICE UNDER SECTION 2112(a) ............ 319
A. The Cost of the Race ........................... 322
B. The Fairness of the Race ........................ 323
C. The Starting Pistol ............................. 325
D. The Scope of the Agency Action .................. 328
1. Single Agency Action ........................ 328
2. Successive Agency Actions .................... 329
f Professor of Law, University of Texas. B.A. 1971, Rice University; J.D.
1974, University of Texas.
An earlier version of this Article was prepared as a report to the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States. The views expressed herein are, however,
the author's own and not necessarily those of any member of that agency or its
advisory committees.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Professors Craig, Gottlieb,
Kissam, Pierce, Schroeder and Shapiro of the University of Kansas School of Law,
Charles Alan Wright of the University of Texas School of Law, William Allen of
Covington and Burling, and Linda Sedivek of the Administrative Conference of the
United States for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article and to




E. Discretionary Transfer .......................... 332
1. Convenience of the Parties .................... 333
2. Regional Impact of the Agency Action .......... 334
3. Comparative Aggrievement ................... 334
4. Same or Similar Proceedings in Another Circuit .. 336
F. Temporary Stays ................................ 342
G. Simultaneous Filings ............................ 343
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM ................................ 345
A. The Need for Reform ........................... 345
B. Patch and Repair ............................... 348
1. Judicial Patch and Repair .................... 348
a. Penalties for Racing ....................... 348
b. Uniform Judicial Adherence to the Doctrine of
Controlling Decision ....................... 350
c. More Frequent Supreme Court Review of Inter-
circuit Conflicts ........................... 351
d. Simultaneous Filings ....................... 352
2. Agency Patch and Repair ..................... 353
C. Statutory Reforms .............................. 355
1. Mechanisms for Eliminating Forum Shopping ... 356
a. Exclusive Venue in a Particular Court ........ 356
b. Exclusive Venue in the Courts of the "Affected
R egions" . ................................ 360
2. Managing Forum Shopping ................... 362
a. Discretionary Mechanisms: The Multi-district
Panel Proposal ............................ 362
b. Discretionary Mechanisms: Transfer Criteria .. 365
(i) Judicial Expertise ..................... 365
(ii) Pendency of Same or Similar Proceeding 367
(iii) Comparative Aggrievement ............. 367
(iv) Regional Nature of the Problem ........ 370
(v) Convenience of the Parties .............. 370
(vi) Convenience of the Courts .............. 370
c. Automatic Mechanisms ..................... 371
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................... 376
1980]
304 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Judicial review of administrative action is a keystone of the
American public law system. In individual agency statutes and in
the Administrative Procedure Act 1 (APA) Congress has given the
federal appellate courts jurisdiction to review agency actions on both
substantive and procedural grounds.2 The APA, however, does not
specify a particular court for review, 3 and the venue provisions of
individual agency statutes commonly allow for review in several
possible circuits. 4 Understandably, an attorney will attempt to
secure judicial review in the circuit in which his or her client will
have the greatest chance for success.3 In multi-party proceedings
that result in multiple appeals to different circuits there must be a
mechanism for determining which court shall hear the case.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a), the agency must file the record of
the proceedings in the circuit in which the first petition was filed.6
1 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
2 The APA gives appellate courts the power to "hold unlawful and set aside"
the results of formal rulemakings and adjudications that are "unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence" and the results of informal rulemakings that are "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not In accordance with law." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A), (E) (1976). The appellate courts also have the power to set aside
agency action that is "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
m . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right; [or] without observance of procedure required by law." Id. §706(2)(B)-
(D).
3 The APA provides for judicial review in "a court specified by statute" or, if
none is specified, in "[any] court of competent jurisdiction." 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976).
This Article will address only direct review of agency action by the United States
courts of appeals. The vast array of agency actions that are reviewable in the first
instance in federal district courts will not be studied here. Obviously, forum shop-
ping opportunities arise In that context also to the extent that venue statutes are
loosely drawn. For an excellent discussion of relative advantages of district court
review versus direct appellate court review, see Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review
of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLuM. L. REv.
1, 39-61 (1975).
4 See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDUTRE § 3816, at 102 n.4 (1976) thereinafter cited as Wicrr & MILLER]; 16 id.
§ 3941, at 305-08 nn.1-59 (citing statutory provisions for review in the United
States courts of appeals); Comment, Venue of NLRB Orders: An Invitation to
Forum Shopping?, 8 STAN. L. REv. 472 (1956). Special venue provisions are not
uncommon. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 307(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(b)(1) (Supp.
1980) (providing for review of certain national standards only in the District of
Columbia Circuit).
G See Comment, supra note 4, at 476; note 42 infra.
6 If proceedings have been instituted in two or more courts of appeals
with respect to the same order the agency, board, commission, or officer
concerned shall file the record in that one of such courts in which a pro-
ceeding with respect to such order was first instituted. The other courts
in which such proceedings are pending shall thereupon transfer them to
the court of appeals in which the record has been filed. For the con-
venience of the parties in the interest of justice such court may thereafter
transfer all the proceedings with respect to such order to any other court
of appeals.
28 U.S.C. §2112(a) (1976). Section 2112(a) on its face applies only to admin-
istrative "orders," and not to "rules." This raises the possibility that the section
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Because the filing rules in the courts of appeals generally allow a
petitioner to file terse and largely uninformative petitions for re-
view, 7 the "first-to-file" rule of section 2112(a) and modern com-
munications technology have combined to precipitate wild and often
bizarre races to the courthouse. The winner is often determined
by the agency's perceptions of the athletic prowess of competing
counsel.8 The inflexibility of the first-to-file rule is softened some-
what by a statutory provision that allows the court in which the
petition was first filed to transfer the proceedings to another circuit
court of appeals "[f]or the convenience of the parties in the interest
of justice." 9 Courts have also spoken of their "inherent power" to
transfer.'0 In deciding whether to order discretionary transfer the
courts have considered many factors, including the presumed con-
venience of the parties," the existence of ongoing proceedings in-
volving the same or similar issues in other circuits, 12 the relative
aggrievement of the parties, 13 and whether the agency action has a
"regional impact." 14 Although the court of first filing normally
hears the case,' 5 a court will occasionally transfer, even to a cir-
cuit in which no petition for review has been filed.' 6
Unfortunately, agency and courthouse clocks have not kept
pace with modern communications technology. In an increasing
number of cases competing petitions have been filed virtually
simultaneously. Several recent agency regulations, which specify
a precise time at some future date at which rules become final for
was intended to address only the final product of agency "adjudications," and not
of "rulemakings." See Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62
IowA L. REv. 1221, 1264-65 n.298 (1977). The courts, however, have not hesi-
tated to apply § 2112(a) to rules as well as orders, and this Article will assume
that no such distinction was intended. See, e.g., Southland Mower Co. v. CPSC,
600 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 598 F.2d 759
(3d Cir. 1979); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979);
BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 582 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1978); Industrial Union
Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
7 See, e.g., FED. R. Ap. P. 15(a); id. Form 3.
8 See, e.g., Tenneco Oil Co., Findings of Fact, Pursuant to Court Order, Con-
cerning Filings of Petitions for Review of FERC Opinion Nos. 10 and 10-A, FERC
Docket Nos. C175-45, et al. (March 28, 1979); text accompanying notes 91-103
infra.
928 U.S.C. §2112(a) (1976).
'0 See cases cited in note 88 infra.
11 See text accompanying notes 153-58 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 128-49 & 169-200 infra.
'3 See text accompanying notes 162-68 infra.
14 See text accompanying notes 159-61 infra.
15 See note 89 infra.
16 See United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979).
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purposes of judicial review, should greatly multiply the number of
such simultaneous filings. 17 These cases raise the threshold ques-
tion of which court should determine who won the race or, in
the absence of any definitive mechanism for resolving that ques-
tion, the appropriate forum for a hearing on the merits. The
courts apparently decide this threshold question through informal
private telephone communications among the judges of the af-
fected circuits.' The designated court then either remands to the
agency for further factfinding on the race issue 19 or decides which
forum is appropriate under the "convenience of the parties in the
interest of justice" test.
The experience of the agencies, lawyers, and courts under sec-
tion 2112 (a) raises two important questions. First, is forum shop-
ping in the context of multi-party appeals an appropriate activity
for lawyers to engage in? Second, assuming forum shopping cannot
or should not be avoided, is the section 2112(a) first-to-file rule
the most appropriate way of regulating that activity? This Article
concludes that forum shopping probably cannot and should not
be avoided entirely. Virtually every rule that can be imagined
for discouraging forum shopping can be avoided by imaginative
counsel, and the multi-circuit review that results from forum shop-
ping can aid the Supreme Court in performing its review functions.
The first-to-file rule and its accoutrements, however, are definitely
not the most appropriate mechanism for choosing among the avail-
able appellate courts. The Article suggests several alternative
mechanisms and ultimately concludes that a simple automatic as-
signment mechanism, such as a lottery, would be greatly preferable
to the current rule.
17 See Environmental Protection Agency, Judicial Review Under Clean Water
Act; Races to the Courthouse, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,046 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Final EPA Race Regulations]; Federal Trade Commission, Trade Regulation Rule-
making Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 36,171 (1979). Race-to-the-courthouse designa-
tions in two individual agency rules have been upheld by the courts of appeals.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. EPA, 610 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1979); Southland
Mower Co. v. CPSC, 600 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1979). Other race-to-the-courthouse
regulations were recently promulgated by OSHA. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1911.12(a) (2),
1911.18(d) (1980).
isSee Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 598 F.2d 759, 767 (3d Cir. 1979).
See also Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. EPA, 610 F.2d 187, 189 n.5 (4th Cir.
1979); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 695 (3d Cir. 1979); Ameri-
can Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
19 See, e.g., Tenneco Oil Co., Additional Findings of Fact, Pursuant to Court
Order, Concerning Filings of Petitions for Review of FERC Opinion Nos. 10 and
10-A, FERC Docket Nos. CI75-45 et al. (Sept. 20, 1979); Leventhal, A Modest
Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 Am. U. L. REv. 881, 909 (1975)
(describing the race-to-the-courthouse factfinding process used in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
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I. FORUM SHOPPING-AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
A. Varieties of Forum Shopping
The recent history of appeals from the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration's (OSHA) standards for toxic chemi-
cals provides an excellent example of forum shopping in operation.
After OSHA's early standards for fourteen carcinogens, 20 asbestos,
21
and vinyl chloride 22 had been affirmed in all major respects by
the Third, District of Columbia, and Second Circuits, respectively,
lawyers for the petroleum industry sought to have OSHA's emer-
gency temporary standard for benzene reviewed in the Fifth Cir-
cuit.23 The affected union sought review in the District of
Columbia Circuit.2 4 The race to the courthouse, however, was
complicated by the lack of a definitive starting gun. Agency of-
ficials met with industry and union officials between 9:30 and 10:00
a.m. on April 29, 1977 to announce the agency's decision. Im-
mediately after this meeting the union petitioners filed a petition
in the District of Columbia Circuit. Notice of the agency decision
was not published in the Federal Register until May 3, 1977, and
the industry petitioners filed their petition for review in the Fifth
Circuit on May 10, 1977. The Fifth Circuit transferred the pro-
ceedings to the District of Columbia Circuit for a determination
as to the appropriate circuit for a decision on the merits. In In-
dustrial Union Department v. Bingham 5 the District of Columbia
Circuit panel split three ways on this threshold question.
Judge Fahy agreed with the agency that the regulations be-
came effective at the end of the April 29 meeting.26 Because the
2 0 Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n
v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).
2 1 Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
22 Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
23 See Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
It is not clear why the industry petitioners chose the Fifth Circuit, rather than
any one of the other six available circuits. Because much of the petroleum industry
is located in Fifth Circuit states, convenience may have been a factor. However,
this does not explain why the American Petroleum Institute, a Washington, D.C.-
based organization, would choose the Fifth Circuit; nor does it explain why Wash-
ington, D.C. counsel, who briefed and argued the case, would choose that circuit.
More likely, that circuit's general pro-industry reputation, see note 42 infra, and
its recent opinion in a case involving a related issue under a different statute, see
Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978), guided counsel
in a southerly direction.
24 See Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
25 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
26Id. 976-79 (Fahy, J., dissenting).
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union was the first to file after that meeting, venue was proper in
the District of Columbia Circuit unless the convenience of the
parties or justice demanded transfer to the Fifth Circuit. Judge
Fahy felt that the District of Columbia Circuit was most convenient
to the parties and therefore saw no reason to transfer.
27
Judge Leventhal agreed with Judge Fahy that the petition was
first filed for the purposes of section 2112(a) in the District of
Columbia Circuit and that it was the most convenient, pointing
out that the parties all had counsel and other representatives in
Washington, D.C.28  Nevertheless, Judge Leventhal believed that
"the interest of justice" required that the court transfer the case
to the Fifth Circuit. Because the record disclosed that not all of
the parties to the administrative proceedings were invited to the
informal meeting of April 29, 1977, at least some parties were
deprived of the opportunity to enter the race. To avoid the ap-
pearance of unfairness, Judge Leventhal voted to transfer.29
Judge Wilkey agreed with the industrial petitioners that the
District of Columbia Circuit did not even have jurisdiction, because
the union filed its petition prior to the time that the agency issued
its order.30 Judge Wilkey believed that the agency order had not
been issued until it had been made available to the general public,
which was subsequent to the filing of the union's petition.31 The
union's petition was therefore invalid, and the case belonged to the
Fifth Circuit, where the only valid petitions had been filed. In
order to avoid a complete impasse, however, Judge Wilkey specu-
lated that had jurisdiction been proper in the District of Columbia
Circuit he would have voted to transfer to the Fifth Circuit in
accordance with Judge Leventhal's reasoning.32 The case was
therefore transferred.
The Industrial Union case might easily have had little practical
impact, beyond providing an entertaining diversion for civil pro-
cedure dilettantes, had the Fifth Circuit simply followed existing
precedents. That court, however, interpreted the agency's statute
27 Id. 979-81. Judge Fahy concluded that the "interest of justice" language
in 28 U.S.C. §2112(a) (1976) simply elaborated upon the "convenience of the
parties," and did not give the court independent grounds for transferring a case.
Id. 979. See note 150 infra.
28 570 F.2d at 967-71 (opinion of Leventhal, J.).
29 Id. 972.
30 Id. 973-76 (opinion of Wilkey, J.).
31 judge Wilkey would have the race begin when "all affected parties have
equal opportunity to gain actual knowledge of the agency action." Id. 976
(emphasis omitted).
32 Id. 967 (per curiam).
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differently from the District of Columbia, Second, and Third Cir-
cuits, and it remanded to the agency for further proceedings.3 3 The
Supreme Court agreed to resolve the conflict in the circuits, and
ultimately upheld the Fifth Circuit's remand. 34 In the meantime,
given the split in circuits, the race to the courthouse for review
of OSHA toxic substance standards assumed a much greater
significance.
OSHA's next standard, setting maximum workplace exposure
levels for lead, predictably precipitated a frantic race to the Third
and Fifth Circuits that ended in a dead heat.m The two courts
conferred informally and decided that the Third Circuit should
determine which court should hear the case on the merits.3 6 Point-
ing out that "[u]nlike race tracks, . . . courts are not equipped with
photoelectric timers," 37 the court refused to decide which party
actually filed first. After declining to use several other suggested
transfer criteria and finding that neither party would be inconven-
ienced by review in either circuit, the court tossed the lighted squib
to the District of Columbia Circuit. The court reasoned that be-
cause the District of Columbia Circuit would soon decide many of
the same questions concerning the health effects of lead in the re-
cently filed appeal from the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) ambient air quality standard for that element, that circuit
was the logical court to take the lead.38 The court recognized that
no one had filed a petition for review in the District of Columbia
Circuit, but insisted that this should not be determinative be-
cause most counsel were located in the District of Columbia in
33 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd
sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844
(1980).
The race chronicled here was theoretically for review only of OSHA's tem-
porary emergency standard for benzene. The court as a practical matter eliminated
that standard when on May 20, 1977, it issued a stay of that standard pending
appeal. Because there was never a hearing on appeal, the stay was never lifted
and the emergency temporary standard never vent into effect. See Occupational
Exposure to Benzene, 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5919 (1978). Petitions for review of the
final benzene standard were filed in several circuits, but they were all transferred
to the Fifth Circuit. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 500. The
reasons for the transfer of these appeals were not published, but one can surmise
that the Fifth Circuit's retention of jurisdiction over the appeal from the emergency
temporary standard was an important factor. See text accompanying notes 137-49
infra.
34 Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
35 United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 695 (3d Cir. 1979).
36 Id.
37Id.
38 Id. 697-98. The court might also have mentioned that the District of Colum-
bia Circuit had gained some familiarity with lead-related issues in Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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any event.39 The parties' race thus left them at a somewhat un-
expected finish line.
The foregoing example demonstrates that forum shopping
comes in several varieties and can occur at several stages in the
evolution of an administrative program. When the agency first
issues an order, sets a national standard, or promulgates national
regulations, there will generally be no controlling precedent in the
circuit courts. An attorney for an aggrieved party can therefore
choose from among the circuits where venue is proper.4" The at-
torney may choose one circuit over another for a number of rea-
sons, including the convenience of the lawyer, the convenience of
the client, the inconvenience of the opponent, the status of the
courts' dockets, or the attorney's perception that his or her client
is more likely to prevail in one circuit than in another.41 If, for
example, the attorney plans to argue that the record support for
the agency's decision is inadequate under the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" or "substantial evidence" standards, the attorney might file
the appeal in a circuit that he or she perceives to be less deferen-
tial toward administrative factfinding. Alternatively, the attorney
might choose a circuit for its reported philosophical bent.
42 Fi-
39 592 F.2d at 698.
40 The attorney must look to the venue provisions of the agency's statute to
ascertain the forums in which venue is proper. Usually, the statutes provide for
venue in the District of Columbia Circuit or the circuit in which the aggrieved
party resides or is conducting business. See 15 WIGrHT & MILLER, supra note 4,
at § 3816. Occasionally, venue is proper exclusively in the District of Columbia
Circuit.
If the applicable venue statute is sufficiently vague, a loser of a first-to-file race
can sometimes preempt the application of § 2112(a) by arguing that venue is
"inappropriate" in the first-filed circuit. See, e.g., Dayton Power & Light Co. v.
EPA, 520 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1975).
41 See generally Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195,
382-90 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hruska Commission Report].
4 2 In Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977), for
example, the union probably selected the District of Columbia Circuit because that
circuit reputedly placed human health concerns on a higher footing than economic
considerations. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Over sufficient periods of time, the courts of appeals acquire reputations among
practicing attorneys that guide them either toward or away from particular circuits
in particular kinds of cases. For example, rumor has it that on environmental
questions the District of Columbia Circuit and First Circuit generally tend to favor
the agency, while the Fourth and Fifth Circuits are generally more "pro-business."
See Klement, Agencies Look for Trigger to Courthouse Race, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 6,
1979, at 7, col. 1; Ross & Goldman, Racing to the Court: An "Unseemly" Way to
Challenge Agency Orders, Nat'l L.J., March 3, 1980, at 27, col. 1; cf. DeLong,
Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REv. 257,
281 n.126 (1979) (comparing District of Columbia and Fifth Circuits). The
reading of the circuits' predilections, of course, depends heavily on the nature of
the action being reviewed. For many agencies, the District of Columbia Circuit
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MULTI-PARTY FORUM SHOPPING
nally, if the client is a major industry that is concentrated in a
particular geographical area, the lawyer might shop for the circuit
encompassing that area because of his or her perception that the
court will be more favorably inclined toward the local client.
After one court has ruled on a question of law or fact involving
a given administrative program, lawyers in future litigation involv-
ing the same program will have a greater incentive to forum
shop.43 The lawyer who now has a favorable precedent in one
circuit will of course attempt to have his or her appeal heard in
that circuit. The incentive will be especially strong if the previous
court ruled for or against the agency on a question of statutory
interpretation or procedural implementation, because the former
court can be expected to follow the "law of the circuit" and re-
affirm its prior holding.44  The incentive should be somewhat
weaker if the prior decision simply tested the record support for
an agency's factual premises and inferences under the "substantial
evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious" tests. A prior holding that
appears to be the least likely circuit to uphold agency action. See, e.g., Hruska
Commission Report, supra note 41, at 383-84, 387 (statements of general counsels
of Comptroller of the Currency and General Service Administration). Finally, a
court's approach to a particular agency action may depend more upon the court's
philosophical view as to the merits of the action than upon its legal approach to
judicial review of administrative action, and courts acquire reputations for philo-
sophical outlooks as well as for deference to agency action or lack thereof.
Whether or not judicial performance warrants these general perceptions is not
directly relevant. See generally Lang & Thomas, Disposition of Patent Cases by
Courts During the Period 1939-1949, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 803 (1950) (tabulating
patent cases by circuit); Comment, Forum-Shopping in the Review of NLRB Orders,
28 U. Cir. L. Ruv. 552 (1961); Comment, Forum-Shopping in Appellate Review of
FTC Cease and Desist Orders, 1968 UTA L. REv. 316. The incentive to forum shop
is based upon perceptions, not reality. This author has collected sufficient evidence
to suggest that attorneys do in fact forum shop on the basis of their perceptions
of the general tendencies of the various circuits. He sent a letter to 62 attorneys
who were listed as attorneys of record in cases involving races to the courthouse
or involving large national environmental and energy cases in which forum shop-
ping was possible. Confidentiality was assured the recipients. Of the 18 relevant
responses, 17 stated that in choosing a forum for review they relied upon their
perceptions that their clients' interests were more likely to prevail in the forums of
their choice. Fifteen called this the most significant factor in their choice. Only
seven stated that they considered either their convenience or the convenience of
their clients in choosing from among the circuits, and seven stated categorically
that convenience was not a consideration. Notes on file with author.
43 In one, perhaps extreme, example a petitioner established a place of business
in the Seventh Circuit solely to take advantage of a favorable prior precedent.
Gerson v. FTC, 325 F.2d 93, 94 n.2 (7th Cir. 1963).
44 See Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. Jomn's L. REV.
406 (1972); Vestal, Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflicts, Concurrence and
Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 U.N.C. L. REv. 123, 161 (1977). The attorney,
of course, cannot have absolute assurance that the panel of the circuit court that
he or she draws will follow the holding of the former panel. See generally Wasby,
Inconsistency in the United States Courts of Appeals: Dimensions and Mechanisms
for Resolution, 32 VA mD. L. Rlv. 1343 (1979).
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an agency's decision either has or lacks sufficient record support is
not a particularly strong indicator of how another panel of the
circuit will view the record support for a different decision by the
same agency. Yet the language of the court's opinion may give
some indication of the degree to which the court is willing to de-
mand that the agency explain itself. This, in addition to the gen-
eral reputation of the courts discussed earlier,45 may provide suf-
ficient incentive to choose one court over another.
The attorney in a later case representing a client who disagrees
with the first appellate court's holding will have a similar incentive
to avoid the former forum; this type of forum shopping might more
appropriately be labeled "forum avoidance." Although intercircuit
disputes on questions of law are not uncommon,46 prior precedents
in one circuit are likely to be followed in other circuits, 47 and the
attorneys in later cases will thus have less incentive to forum shop
than their predecessors had. Nevertheless, as the American Petro-
leum Institute learned in the benzene case,48 the potential rewards
may justify the extra expense, even if the chances for victory are
low. When the prior court only examined the record support of
the agency's conclusions, however, the incentive to avoid that circuit
may not be as high, especially if the former holding runs contrary
to the court's general reputation.
B. The Policies For and Against Forum Shopping
1. Disadvantages of Forum Shopping
a. Public Image of Lawyers and Courts
The spectacle of a race to the courthouse may detract somewhat
from the public image of the judicial system as an impartial and
consistent dispenser of justice. Hence, blatant attempts to select
forums are often condemned as "unseemly." 49 Yet, because races
4 See note 42 supra.
46 See Vestal, supra note 44, at 162.
47 See id. 165-66.
48 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd
sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844
(1980).
49 See, e.g., Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662, 664 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980); Industrial
Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (opinion of Leven-
thai, J.); Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588, 592-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Leventhal, supra note 19, at 909 ("Discussion often castigates
'unseemly' forum shopping, although I have never seen a reference to 'seemly'




to the courthouse and other more subtle attempts to forum shop
rarely claim much, if any, media attention outside of the specialized
legal press, this fear may be somewhat overblown.
b. Judicial Comity
When two courts are presented with the opportunity to review
the same administrative order, judicial comity demands that one
court yield to the other.5° The doctrine of judicial comity is thus
designed to prevent "unseemly conflict" among the courts.5 1 But
the doctrine does not always specify which court shall yield. Forum
shopping attempts can therefore threaten the carefully nurtured
goodwill that exists among the federal appellate courts. An extreme
example of a threat to judicial comity caused by forum shopping is
Montship Lines, Ltd. v. FMB,52 in which petitions for review of a
Federal Maritime Board order were filed in the Second and District
of Columbia Circuits. The first petition was filed in the District of
Columbia Circuit, and the agency filed a certified appendix of the
record in that circuit. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit upheld the
order before the District of Columbia Circuit had ruled on the
matter 3 The District of Columbia Circuit, taking note of
the Second Circuit decision, assumed jurisdiction and vacated the
order. The court did not explain why the Second Circuit holding
was not res judicata; it held only that the question of the Second
Circuit's jurisdiction was not before it.54
For obvious reasons the courts of appeals would prefer that
they not be forced into the position of issuing orders that directly
conflict with those of sister courts or that effectively govern pro-
ceedings in other circuits. Because federal agencies often take
actions that are appropriate for review in more than one circuit,
forum shopping for review of administrative action can be a par-
ticularly potent threat to judicial comity.Y5 With a few exceptions,
50 See, e.g., Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-G-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180,
183 (1952). See also GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1194, 1202 n.11 (1980).
51 Valley Vision, Inc. v. FCC, 383 F.2d 218, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
52295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
53 Kerr S.S. Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated as
moot, 369 U.S. 422 (1962).
54 295 F.2d at 151. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 485
F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (District of Columbia Circuit orders parties to pro-
ceedings in Northern District of Mississippi to move for immediate dismissal in
that court so that proceedings may be heard in their entirety in the District of
Columbia Circuit).
65 See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. CPSC, 590 F.2d 1209
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (even though District of Delaware enjoined agency from releas-
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such as the case discussed above, however, the federal first-to-file
statute 56 has avoided threats to judicial comity, because it specifies
precisely which court shall take jurisdiction. Yet, the recent wave
of cases involving simultaneous filings 57 has renewed the threat to
judicial comity. Thus far, courts of appeals have been able to work
out privately the court that decides which court shall hear the
merits of controversies involving simultaneous filings.58 That in-
formal approach may become increasingly strained in the future as
simultaneous filings begin to occur in more than two circuits.5 9
c. Uniform Application of Agency Policy
Forum shopping can threaten agency attempts to apply policy
uniformly across the country.60 The most immediate impact of
forum shopping on an agency's decisionmaking process is the effect
on the agency of the knowledge that its action may well be reviewed
by the least sympathetic of all of the federal courts. For admin-
istrative factfinding and inference-drawing this effect may be alto-
gether salutary. Careful agency analysis is generally a thing to be
encouraged, and the courts of appeals are in any event usually dis-
inclined to substitute their judgments for that of the agency on
questions of factual inference. For questions involving statutory
interpretation and the implementation of broad statutory policies,
however, the knowledge that an unsympathetic court might inter-
ing data, District of Columbia district court could order agency to release the same
data), rev'd sub nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1194 (1980).
56 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1976).
57 See cases cited in note 206 infra.
58 See text accompanying notes 209-10 infra.
59 The conflict predicted has in fact recently arisen in the context of a juris-
dictional squabble between the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits. Peti-
tions for review of certain EPA regulations were filed simultaneously in the Fourth,
Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits. Faced with the task of deciding which
circuit would hear the petitions, the three circuits conferred informally and de-
cided to settle the question by lot. The Fourth Circuit was chosen. See National
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 15 ENviR. REP. (BNA) 1157 (D.C. Cir.
1980). The District of Columbia Circuit, however, apparently refused to be bound
by the results of the lottery and broke off negotiations. See Virginia Elec. &
Power Co. v. EPA, Nos. 79-1347 et al. (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 1980) (unpublished
order). Miffed, the Fourth Circuit went ahead and assumed jurisdiction. See id.
The District of Columbia Circuit nonetheless ignored the Fourth Circuit order
cited supra, assumed jurisdiction, and in a lengthy opinion issued in November,
1980, explained why it and not the Fourth Circuit should hear the case. See Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc., 15 ENvYR. REP. at 1157-64. Thus, the
matter is being adjudicated before two circuits, each refusing to give way to the
other.
60 See, e.g., Dayton Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 520 F.2d 703, 708 (6th Cir.
1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 495 (1st
Cir. 1972). See also Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 65-66.
[Vol. 129:302
MULTI-PARTY FORUM SHOPPING
pret its statute differently may cause the agency to be unduly timid
in implementing its statutory mandate.61
Even if an agency chooses to implement forcefully its mandate
and risk a legal challenge in a potentially unfriendly circuit, a
successful defense before the court does little to ensure the evolution
of a uniform policy. Other parties in later litigation can race to
different circuits to obtain conflicting interpretations. In this age
of the "polycentric" administrative dispute,6 2 the ability to forum
shop may leave the law unsettled until the Supreme Court decides
the issue, which in many cases can be a substantial length of time.
Particularly when the agency is facing statutorily imposed deadlines,
this uncertainty can defeat the successful implementation of national
policy.63 The OSHA experience is once again a good example.
After OSHA's approach to regulating toxic chemicals in the work-
place had survived appeals in three circuits,64 the agency sought to
solidify some of the principles that had been announced in those
cases in a generic carcinogen regulation. OSHA anticipated that
the generic regulations would eliminate the need to litigate certain
questions, such as the validity of extrapolating from laboratory
animals to humans, 65 on a case-by-case basis. In the midst of the
rulemaking proceeding on the generic regulations, however, the
Fifth Circuit, following a classic race to the courthouse, ruled that
OSHA's former approach did not comply with the statute.66 This
holding, of course, cast a pall upon the generic carcinogen effort,
and the new issues raised by the Fifth Circuit litigation slowed
down the rulemaking process considerably.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has been diligent in detecting
conflicts among the circuits on questions of statutory interpretation
involving nationally applicable administrative standards, and it has
61 The author recalls many instances during his stint with the Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of General Counsel, in the mid-1970s in which agency
lawyers evaluated a regulation to determine whether it would survive review in
the Fourth Circuit, the court perceived to be the most hostile forum for review of
EPA regulations.
62 See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 McH. L. REV. 111, 116-20
(1972).
63 See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 517 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cir.
1975); Hruska Commission Report, supra note 41, at 382-87.
64 See notes 20-22 supra & accompanying text
65 The Third Circuit had opined that the mouse-to-man extrapolation problem
was "a legal rather than a factual determination." Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1159 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973
(1975).
66 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd
sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844
(1980).
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granted certiorari in most of the important recent cases.67 If the
Court continues this practice, agencies and litigants will at least
have some assurance that administrative programs will not remain
in flux indefinitely. Even this, however, may not be enough when
the agency is operating under a statutory deadline. For example,
although the District of Columbia Circuit in 1975 strongly intimated
that EPA had authority to promulgate uniform national effluent
limitations for categories of existing industrial sources mandating the
application of the best practicable technology economically achiev-
able by July 1, 1977, s the Eighth Circuit held that EPA had no
such authority. 9 EPA nevertheless adhered to its original position
and received favorable rulings on this point from six other cir-
cuits 70 before the Supreme Court finally granted certiorari in one
of the cases and ruled in EPA's favor.7' It was thus not until
February 23, 1977-five months before the technology was to be
in place-that EPA's authority was definitively established. Be-
cause EPA had not always insisted during the pendancy of the
litigation that its uniform guidelines be incorporated into indus-
trial-waste discharge permits, it was impossible for many of the
sources to comply with the 1977 deadline. 72 Congress ultimately
amended the Act to give those companies that had been litigating
67 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
2844 (1980); United States v. Ward, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S.
246 (1976); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
68 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
69 CPC Int'l v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
70 American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.
1976); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976),
aff'd in relevant part, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d
442 (7th Cir. 1975); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir.
1975).
71E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
72 During this time, EPA and the states that had permit-writing authority had
been issuing permits pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1) (1976), which allowed
the permitting authority, prior to implementation of the national effluent limitations,
to apply "such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act." See W. RODcERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.11
(1977). Each permitting action, however, could be appealed to the Administrator
for an adjudicatory hearing, and ultimately for review in a court of appeals, see
Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); United States Steel
Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977), where the technological questions
that were settled in the litigation over the national standards could be relitigated
on a case-by-case basis. Not surprisingly, many of the permits issued during the
interim period were not as stringent as the national effluent limitations would have
required. See La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protec-
tion Statutes, 62 IowA L. Rnv. 771, 822 (1977).
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Forum shopping for review of questions of law can produce
an environment of uncertainty that may discourage businesses from
investing capital in productive enterprises.74 Once a court of ap-
peals has decided a nationally applicable question of law, individual
companies affected by that ruling understandably would like to rely
on the holding in making future business decisions. They cannot
confidently prepare for the future, however, if there is a strong
possibility that the agency, a competitor, union, or public interest
group might obtain a contrary ruling from another court of ap-
peals sometime in the future. For important questions of national
energy, environmental and health policy, and, to a more limited
extent, labor policy, the uncertainty generated by the possibility
of future inconsistent holdings might have detrimental conse-
quences for investment on a national scale.
The effects of forum shopping on business uncertainty should
not, however, be exaggerated. The amount of additional uncer-
tainty due to the possibility that courts of appeals will reach incon-
sistent decisions on questions of law may not be great when
compared to the uncertainty due to other business imponderables. 75
Indeed, a business always faces the risk, entirely unrelated to forum
shopping, that Congress will reverse a court of appeals ruling by
amending the agency's statute. In volatile regulatory areas, such
as energy and environmental regulation, this risk is easily as great
as the risk of conflicting appellate decisions. Finally, such business
7 3 Clean Water Act §309(a)(5)(B), Pub. L. No. 95-217, §56(c), 91 Stat.
1593 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1319(a)(5)(B) (Supp. I1 1979)). See
Monongahela Power Co. v. EPA, 586 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1978). Similar delay in
securing judicial review of EPA's recently promulgated rules for implementing the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit-granting process threatens
successful implementation of that program. See Sive, EPA Water Pollution Rules:
Stuck In a Multiple Review Bottleneck, Nat'l L.J., March 10, 1980, at 25, col. 1.
A similar fate may await OSHA's new carcinogen rules. See [1980] 3 Ci-mm.
REG. RP,. (BNA) 1874.
74 See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat
to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 542, 597
(1969) ("To the extent that circuits seem to offer the planner different results,
ventures that are only marginal on an economic assessment are overlaid with
unresolvable confusion."); Leventhal, supra note 19, at 896; Pierce, The Choice
Between Adjudicating and Rulemaking for Formulating and Implementing Energy
Policy, 31 HASTINGS LJ. 1, 21-27 (1979) (detailing the costs to society of business
uncertainty due to delay in resolving crucial national energy issues).
75 See H. RAnwA, DEcisioN ANALYsis: INTRODUCTORY LEcTuRES ON Cuorcs
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 27-32 (1968).
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risks are most likely to result from forum shopping to secure re-
view of questions of law. Given the greater degree of deference
accorded by the appellate courts to agency findings of fact, the
chance of significant differences in appellate review of administra-
tive factual determinations is relatively remote.
e. Costs of Forum Shopping
Forum shopping costs money. Under the current first-to-file
statute, parties spend much time and money on the walkie-talkies
and other arcane paraphernalia necessary to pursue their elaborate
races to the courthouse. Once the race is complete the parties
frequently consume additional resources litigating over who won
the race. In the case of simultaneous filings, and in any alternative
system that relies upon a balancing of criteria to determine the
appropriate circuit, the parties must consume further time and
energy debating the correct balance of the relevant factors. One
can justifiably question the fairness and efficacy of a system that
demands costly expenditures for the rendering of threshold deter-
minations, irrelevant to the merits of the case, especially in situa-
tions in which one party can ill-afford the cost.7 6 In addition to
the drain on client resources, forum shopping consumes the judicial
and agency resources that must go into administering the forum
shopping mechanism. Finally, forum shopping on questions of
law can result in two or more courts devoting valuable judicial
resources to duplicative efforts.7
7
2. The Advantages of Forum Shopping
Despite its numerous costs, forum shopping has two offsetting
advantages. For questions of law and for some generally applicable
questions of procedure, forum shopping can provide the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to observe how several circuit court
judges have resolved difficult questions before deciding them for
itself. For example, the Supreme Court in deciding that EPA
had authority to set national effluent limitations under the Clean
Water Act7s noted "the wisdom of allowing difficult issues to ma-
76 See note 114 infra & accompanying text.
7 7 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F.2d 492, 495
(1st Cir. 1972) ("[W]e do not feel that judicial manpower is so abundant so [sic]
as to permit several circuits to solve identical complex legal and factual issues ... .
78 See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
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ture through full consideration by the courts of appeals." 71 Simi-
larly Judge Leventhal has suggested that "[t]here are advantages
of multiple judicial input on issues. This is a concept of feedback,
of a simmering or percolating effect." 1o Other commentators have
likewise stressed the value of creative conflicts among the cir-
cuits. 8 ' Additionally, tie conflict in the circuits that can result
from forum shopping can be a very effective signal to the Supreme
Court that an important issue needs its attention. 2 Forum shop-
ping on legal and perhaps procedural questions can thus benefit
the legal process. The extent to which the "percolation" and sig-
naling advantages of forum shopping outweigh its significant dis-
advantages is an overriding question to be addressed in connection
with the following critical analysis of the current first-to-file rule
and the possible alternatives for reform.
I. CURRENT PRACTICE UNDER SEcTION 2112 (a)
Before 1958, an agency's ability to file the record in a court
of appeals gave it the practical power to choose which of the avail-
able circuits would hear the appeal.83  In 1955, however, the Com-
79E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.26 (1977).
See also Circuit Clash Heartens EPA Air Enforcers, Legal Times of Washington,
Aug. 20, 1979, at 17, col. 1.
80 Leventhal, supra note 19, at 908 (footnote omitted).
8 1 See H. FRmNDLY, FEnDmiA JURISDIcTIoN: A GNEAL VEw 186 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as GENERAL VIEW]; Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 69;
Hruska Commission Report, supra note 41, at 219; Oakes, Developments in Environ-
mental Law, [1973] 3 EwvT'L L. REP. (ELI) 50,001, 50,011. But see Note,
Securing Uniformity in National Law: A Proposal for National Stare Decisis in the
Courts of Appeals, 87 YALE L.J. 1219, 1245 (1978) ("It is not at all clear, however,
that conflict consistently produces such synthesis. In regulatory law-much con-
cerned, as it is, with detail-conflict is likely to create confusion among lawyers,
clients, and the judiciary.").
82 So long as the Supreme Court is relied on to be the final arbiter of the
interpretation of regulatory statutes, conflicts are a good thing-not a bad
one. They point up the areas where there are grounds for reasonable
differences of opinion and flash a signal to which the Court must ultimately
respond.
Remarks by Henry Friendly, Appellate Judges' Conference, A.B.A. Convention
(Aug. 4, 1968), reprinted in CAsE & COMM-NT, March-April, 1969, at 23, 25.
See also GmqmAm VIEw, supra note 81, at 187. These advantages of forum shop-
ping are less obvious in cases in which the only issue is the sufficiency of the
record support for the agency's factual determinations. Differing appellate court
holdings on diverse factual determinations can have little educational value for the
Supreme Court; nor can they effectively signal the need for Supreme Court review
of agency factflnding and inference-drawing.
8 3 See Ball v. NLRB, 299 F.2d 683, 687 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
838 (1962) (detailing the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 2 112(a) (1976));
16 WimcHT & MLLER, supra note 4, § 3944, at 332; Comment, A Proposal to End
the Race to the Court House in Appeals from Federal Administrative Orders, 68
CoL m. L. REv. 166, 168-69 (1968).
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mittee of Revision of the Laws of the Judicial Conference of the
United States proposed to limit the agency's discretion by requiring
that the record be filed in the circuit "in which in its judgment
the proceedings may be carried on with the greatest convenience
to all the parties involved." 84 After the American Bar Associa-
tion and several agencies complained that this would still give
agencies too much discretion, s Congress enacted section 2112(a), 8
which provides that the record shall be filed in the circuit in which
the first petition was filed. That circuit may in turn transfer the
proceedings to any other court of appeals "[fjor the convenience of
the parties in the interest of justice." 87 The courts of appeals
have, in addition, recognized an "inherent power" in a court of
appeals to transfer a case to another court of appeals irrespective
of any statutory authority.8 In the typical case, however, the
circuit in which the first petition is filed will hear the merits of
the appeal, 9 a prospect that has precipitated vigorous and wasteful
races to the courthouse.90
One of the most bizarre and expensive courthouse races oc-
curred in an appeal from a recent Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) decision, Tenneco Oil Company.91 On June
21, 1978 FERC issued an opinion denying applications for rehear-
84 H.R. 6682, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1955), reprinted in Appeal of Admin-
istrative Agency Decisions: Hearings on H.R. 6682 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1956).
85 See Fels, Beyond the Stopwatch: Determining Appellate Venue on Review
of FERC Orders, I ENERGY L.J. 35, 38-39 (1980); Comment, supra note 83, at
168-69.
86 Pub. L. No. 85-791, § 2, 72 Stat. 941 (1958), as amended by Pub. L. No.
89-773, § 5(a), 80 Stat. 1323 (1966) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1976)).
87 Id.
88 See, e.g., Pearce v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
603 F.2d 763, 771, n.3 (9th Cir. 1979) (collecting the cases by circuit); Dayton
Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 520 F.2d 703, 708 (6th Cir. 1975); Farah Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1973); 15 WnicHT & MiLTEa, supra note
4, § 3816, at 102 n.6.
This Article will refer to transfers under either the power explicitly granted
by § 2112(a) or a court's inherent power to transfer as "discretionary transfer."
s In most cases the loser of the race apparently concedes, and the litigation
proceeds in the circuit of first filing. When discretionary transfers have been re-
quested the requests have been granted approximately one-half of the time. See
note 152 infra.
90At least one loser has argued that § 2112(a) should be read so as to make
the filing of multiple petitions "simultaneous" if occurring on the same day. See
Ball v. NLRB, 299 F.2d 683, 686 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 838 (1962).
Such a reading would substantially reduce the possibility of inordinately hectic
races, although it may create a well-nigh intolerable threat to judicial comity be-
cause petitions could be filed in several circuits. See notes 50-58 supra & accom-
panying text. In any case, this idea was rejected early on in favor of the current
"hour and minute" (and "second") rule. See Ball v. NLRB, 299 F.2d at 686-87.
91 FERC Docket Nos. C175-45, et al.
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ing on requests by several interstate pipelines for authorization to
transport natural gas produced in the offshore federal domain to
several onshore gas consuming facilities.92 Petitions for review were
filed in the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits at approxi-
mately 3:02 p.m. EDT. The Fifth Circuit, pursuant to its own
rules of procedure,93 referred the matter to FERC for findings
as to which party filed first.94 Holding that the ultimate finding of
who won the race "is a question that must ultimately be resolved
by the courts of appeals," the Commission ordered the Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ) "to conduct such proceedings as he con-
siders necessary" and to file a report to the Commission.95
The ALJ gamely followed these instructions, and held three
days of hearings at FERC headquarters, the District of Columbia
Circuit courthouse and the Fifth Circuit courthouse, during which
the parties reenacted the race. 6 According to the ALJ's findings,
Tenneco had a five-person line-of-sight human chain from the
FERC offices on the first floor to an open telephone line on the
second floor. Three reenactments of the sequences resulted in find-
ings of 2.11, 1.16, and 0.95 seconds for this link in the chain.97
At the other end of the telephone line, Tenneco maintained a two-
man chain to await the signal in the federal courthouse in New
Orleans.9 Another petitioner, Air Products, took the Commission
at its word that it would release its decision at precisely 3:00 p.m.
EDT and filed a petition in the Fifth Circuit at 3:01 p.m. EDT,
prior to the signal from Tenneco's human chain.
The Public Service Commission of the State of New York,
which was racing to the District of Columbia Circuit, prepared two
human chains, one being a subterfuge to confuse the timing of
Tenneco's chain. After three trial runs the ALJ calculated that
the Public Service Commission's chain, which ran across a court-
yard to another building, consumed between 1.36 and 1.84 seconds.
92 Tenneco Oil Co., FERC Docket Nos. CI75-45, et al., Opinion No. 10A,
(June 21, 1978).
93 See 5TH Cm. R. 11.5.
94 Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v. FERC, No. 78-2011 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1978)
(per curiam order). The District of Columbia Circuit acquiesced in this proce-
dure. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FERC, No. 78-1573 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 1978)
(per curiam order).
95 Tenneco Oil Co., Order Establishing Additional Proceeding Pursuant to
Court Order 3, FERC Docket Nos. CI75-45, et al. (Nov. 20, 1978).
96 Tenneco Oil Co., Findings of Fact, Pursuant to Court Order, Concerning
Filings of Petitions for Review of FERC Opinion Nos. 10 and 10-A, FERC Docket
Nos. Cr75-45, et al., at 2 (March 28, 1979).
97 Id. app. 4.
93 Id. app. 5.
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Another chain at the District of Columbia Circuit courthouse
relayed the message to a Public Service Commission operative at
the District of Columbia Circuit timeclock. 99
The ALJ set forth the above factual findings and the Com-
mission adopted them. The Fifth Circuit, however, was dissatisfied
with the Commission's action, because the Commission had made
findings accurate to the second with respect to only one party. The
court, therefore, remanded once again to the Commission for "to-
the-second" findings for both parties and an ultimate finding as to
which party filed first.100 The Commission referred the matter back
to the ALJ,101 who responded with an elaborate chart that related
the events to the hundredth of a second. 02 Because Tenneco had
begun its process slightly before the order had been stamped in the
FERC office, the ALJ found that Tenneco won the race, although
he admitted that his conclusion was "based more on perception and
probability than upon any demonstrable fact." 103
A. The Cost of the Race
The mere telling of this tale vividly demonstrates one of the
major failings of the first-to-file rule as currently administered-it is
a foolish waste of judicial, administrative, and client resources. The
Office of the Federal Register has in fact complained that the
presence of lawyers in its offices waiting for some race or another to
begin interferes with its work. 04 A conservative estimate of the
expenses of a more recent race for review of a FERC order yields a
cost to clients of $65,000.105 To this must be added the expense to
99 Id. app. 5-7.
100 Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v. FERC, No. 78-2011 (5th Cir. July 19, 1979)
(per curiam order).
101 Tenneco Oil Co., Order Remanding Proceeding to Administrative Law Judge
for Supplemental Report, FERC Docket Nos. C175-45 et al. (Aug. 16, 1979).
102 Tenneco Oil Co., Additional Findings of Fact, Pursuant to Court Order,
Concerning Filings of Petitions for Review of FERC Opinion Nos. 10 and 10-A,
FERC Docket Nos. CI75-45, et al., at app. 3-4 (Sept. 20, 1979).
103 Id. app. 5. For other recent accounts of this race, see Cook, Racing to the
Courthouse: Is Justice Left Behind?, IumusmRY W=-x, May 26, 1980, at 44; Fels,
supra note 85, at 35-36.
104 See Final EPA Race Regulations, supra note 17, at 26,047 n.5.
105 The race, as related to the author by one of the participants, involved
three racers-two to the Fifth Circuit and one to the District of Columbia Circuit.
Both Fifth Circuit petitioners maintained open conference telephone lines to the
Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits from FERC headquarters. Both had two
paralegals and one part-time lawyer in New Orleans, one paralegal and two part-
time lawyers at FERC headquarters, and one paralegal at the District of Columbia
Circuit for nine hours a day for ten working days. The District of Columbia peti-
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the government of administrative and judicial hearings on who won
the race and on the threshold transfer issue. The litigation costs to
both parties and the government could thus easily exceed $100,000
in a typical case. That other circuits do not appear to be as in-
sistent as the Fifth Circuit that the agencies determine the winner
of the race with split second accuracy,e reduces these latter ex-
penditures somewhat in those circuits. Nevertheless, the cost to
clients continues to climb as racing techniques grow increasingly
sophisticated.
B. The Fairness of the Race
If races-to-the-courthouse are allowed to determine the appro-
priate forum for the appeal, it is necessary to ensure that the race
be conducted fairly. The need for fairness occasionally requires
the courts to act as referees. For example, in the previously
described race-to-the-courthouse for review of OSHA's benzene
standard, 07 Judge Leventhal cast the deciding vote in favor of trans-
fer from the circuit of first filing to the Fifth Circuit because he
believed that the Assistant Secretary's private meeting with the
union and several industry representatives-before making her de-
cision available to the rest of the parties and the general public-
gave some parties an unfair head start. 08
Agency service by mail poses additional fairness problems, be-
cause it gives an inherent advantage to the parties living closest to
tioner maintained one paralegal and one part-time lawyer at FERC headquarters
and at the District of Columbia Circuit, and an open local telephone line between
the two points. Because the Fifth Circuit ruled that an appeal was not ripe until
after the agency had ruled on a motion for rehearing, the race had to be run once
again. The second time, however, only one Fifth Circuit petitioner raced and the
parties were required to be prepared for only four working days.
106 In United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979),
the court ruled that petitions that were filed within the same minute were
simultaneously filed, despite arguments that one petition was filed ten seconds ear-
lier than the other. See also American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FEC, 555 F.2d 852
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (court accepts agency's finding that the petitions were fied
simultaneously); Municipal Distribs. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367, 1368 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) ("We are by no means confident that the difference of two seconds
in the stamped filing time of the petitions . . . is sufficiently meaningful to estab-
lish the automatic application of the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) . . . .. ); In-
ternational Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 343 F.2d 327, 329
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (court accepts agency's conclusion that neither party can be
said to be the first to file). But see Abourezk v. FPC, 513 F.2d 504, 505 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (even though time stamps on pleadings indicated that clocks of the
courthouses were not accurate enough to determine winner of race, litigants en-
titled to "an examination delving beyond the four comers of the pleadings").
10 7 See text accompanying notes 20-39 supra.
108 Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 972-73 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (opinion of Leventhal, J.).
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Washington, D.C.10 9 Similarly, mail service poses the ever-present
possibility of a mail mix-up that penalizes one party through no
fault of its own. In International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers v. NLRB, n0 for example, the agency, following
standard procedure, announced its decision by mail. Some copies
were to be sent by registered mail and others were to be sent by
first class mail. Although both sets of letters were delivered to the
agency's mail room at the same time, the Postal Service inexplicably
picked up the first class mail on one day and the registered mail on
the next. The union, which was on the first class mailing list, con-
sequently received its copy of the decision before the parties on the
registered mail list and filed the first petition for review. Rejecting
the company's contention that the unfairness of the notification
procedure required transfer to another circuit, the court agreed with
Judge Wilkey's opinion in Industrial Union Department v. Bing-
ham 111 that there is no practical way to ensure that all parties are
informed simultaneously:
What the appearance of justice requires is that the noti-
fication procedure utilized be one fairly designed to afford
affected parties an equal opportunity to gain adequate
knowledge of the agency action. The first class mail serv-
ice in these cases did not in fact result in actual notice of
the Board's decision to all parties at the same time, but it
would be inaccurate to say that the opportunities were
skewed from the outset."
2
The court thus apparently concluded that if a notification mecha-
nism is not inherently biased in favor of a single participant, a
court will not inquire into its unfair application in individual
cases. While this is perhaps justifiable under the "sporting" theory
that the next Postal Service errors might just as easily work to a
union's detriment, the court's explanation was probably not satis-
fying to the companies that lost the unfair race. The real lesson of
International Union, however, is the implications that it has for
the inherent fairness of a system that depends so critically upon the
109 See International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 610
F.2d 956, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Comment, supra note 83, at 171-72. This
problem is ameliorated somewhat by the prevailing practice of large corporate liti-
gants of hiring Washington, D.C. counsel, and the increasing trend of law firms
outside that city to open Washington, D.C. offices. See Lewin, Law Firms Branch
Out, Go National, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 7, 1978, at 1, col. 4.
110 610 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
111570 F.2d 965, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (opinion of Wilkey, J.).
112 610 F.2d at 963-64 (emphasis in original).
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Postal Service, battery-operated courthouse clocks, and the speed
with which secretaries and court clerks open their mail.113
More fundamentally, in the relatively rare cases in which there
is a large disparity in the parties' wealth, one might legitimately
question a system that allows the party with the resources to afford
open long-distance telephone lines and sophisticated electronic
equipment to choose the forum for review. In the typical FERC
case the petitioners are equally well endowed to afford a sophisti-
cated courthouse race. Similarly, the capacity of labor unions to
absorb the cost of race is not far different from that of their em-
ployer antagonists. Consumer and environmental groups, however,
often operate on shoestring budgets, and it seems less fair to require
them to race on the same terms as their industrial opponents." 4
C. The Starting Pistol
Because a false start can just as easily result in a defeat as a
slow pace," 5 the parties all have a legitimate concern that there
be an agreed upon starting gun. Nevertheless, most agencies have
until very recently taken a lackadaisical attitude toward designating
the moment in time at which an order is ripe for review, leaving
the parties to fight about that question at the appellate level. In
the previously described race-to-the-courthouse for review of OSHA's
benzene temporary standard," 6 for example, Judge Wilkey felt that
the court did not even have jurisdiction to order transfer to the
Fifth Circuit. In his opinion the union had jumped the gun when
it filed its petition immediately after a private meeting with the
Assistant Secretary, without waiting for the agency to inform the
public through a press conference." 7 Because the agency action
1
13 See City of Chicago v. FTC, 360 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (although
petitions were received on the same morning by two courts of appeals, § 2112(a)
requires that record remain in circuit in which clerk first stamped petition with a
docket number).
114 See Letter from J. Taylor Banks, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
to Joan Z. Bernstein, General Counsel, EPA (Feb. 20, 1979), reprinted in 44 Fed.
Reg. 32,008 (1979).
15 See Southland Mower Co. v. CPSC, 600 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1979) (dis-
missing several petitions as premature); Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570
F.2d 965, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (opinion of Wilkey, J.); cf. J.P. Stevens & Co.
v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1237, 1239 (4th Cir. 1979) (court transfers to Second Circuit
for determination whether union filed too soon); Fels, supra note 85, at 40-42.
31
6 See notes 20-39 supra & accompanying text.
"17Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d at 974-75 (opinion of Wil-
key, J.) (citing Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 476 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in
which the court held that an agency order was ripe for review at the time the
agency made its decision public through a press release).
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was not in his opinion ripe for review at the time the union filed
its petition, the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal.118 Although no court has yet disqualified a racer for a false
start,119 the threat is always present, and it remains a fertile source
for additional threshold litigation.
At the other extreme, the unwary practitioner can discover
that the race has already ended before he has even assumed his
position at the starting blocks. Ripeness for review is a protean
concept,12 0 and the attorney who wants to win must be awake to
any agency action that might render the agency proceeding ripe for
review. For example, in Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB,' 21 the peti-
tioner who waited until the agency released the actual text of
its regulations discovered that it had lost the race to the petitioner
who had filed immediately after the agency had issued a press
release describing the regulations. 22  Counsel must also be aware
of the agency's statute or regulations governing the status of an
order that is subject to a motion for reconsideration. If such a
118 Id.
"
0 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 598 F.2d 759, 765-69 (3d Cir.
1979) (petitions filed after order terminating environmental impact proceedings,
rather than after release of statement of reasons for order, not premature); Kronen-
berger v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1974) (petition filed immediately after
order, rather than after agency ruling on motion for reconsideration, not premature);
Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 476 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (petition filed after
press release, rather than after release of text of order, not premature).
12
0 See generally K. DAvis, ADMISTRATIVE LAW OF TH SEvENrs §§ 21.06-
21.07 (1976); K. DAvis, ADmIsNI rvTE LAw TREATIsE §§ 21.06-21.07 (1958).
121 476 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
12 2 See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 598 F.2d 759, 765-68 & n.21
(3d Cir. 1979) (statement of reasons need not accompany an administrative or-
der to make that order "final" and hence ripe for review; petitioner who waited
for statement of reasons consequently lost the race).
See also ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir.
1980), in which a Second Circuit panel split over determination of the appropriate
starting gun. In that case, the FCC on December 12 adopted an order in a public
meeting accompanied by a news release, but without a formal written opinion.
The formal opinion was not released until some three weeks later. At issue was
whether the order was ripe for review for the purposes of § 2112(a) as of De-
cember 12. Judge Mansfield, joined by Judge Lumbard, opined that, unless the
agency specifies an effective date, an order becomes ripe for review when an-
nounced at a meeting where "all parties [have] an equal opportunity to learn
fairly and simultaneously of the Commission's action and of the terms of its order
and decision." Id. 1209 (Mansfield, J., concurring); accord note 31 supra. Judge
Newman, on the other hand, advocated an entirely different approach. If the
point at which the order is ripe for review is ambiguous, as he felt it was in this
case, then he advised abandoning the first-to-file rule and following a "convenience
of the parties" test. See 621 F.2d at 1206-07; notes 153-58 infra & accompanying
text. Judge Newman admitted that unless an agency specifies a time at which an
order becomes effective, the time at which the order becomes ripe will generally
be ambiguous. See 621 F.2d at 1207 n.8. Thus, this proposed exception could
swallow the first-to-file rule. It remains to be seen if other circuits will respond
more favorably to Judge Newman's suggestion than did his colleagues on the paneL
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motion is required, then the only appropriate time for filing an
appeal is after the agency has ruled on the motion.123  When the
agency has not specified by regulation whether a motion for recon-
sideration is required, the party that awaits the agency's final ruling
on the motion can discover that the race was over weeks ago when
the petition for review of the original agency action was filed.'
24
The lesson that the diligent attorney can draw from this is
that it is prudent to file a petition for review after every agency
movement that might conceivably be construed as the starting
gun. If the attorneys for all of the parties are equally diligent,
the result can be not one, but many sophisticated races to the court-
house for review of a single agency action. The reductio ad ab-
surdum of this approach is the classic Shell Oil Co. v. FPC 125 race
in which innovative attorneys beat the system by preparing mul-
tiple copies of a single petition and filing them at two second
intervals on either side of the time that the agency's decision
was expected. 26  The circuit in which this occurred did not ques-
tion the fairness of this procedure, noting only that such forum
shopping is "inherent in the statute." 127
12 3 See American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir.
1976) ("Under the Natural Gas Act, an order lacks jurisdictional ripeness for re-
view until the Commission has disposed of a petition to reconsider alleged error
in it (or until a reasonable time to act upon such petition has expired).").
12 4 See Kronenberger v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1974).
125 509 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1975).
126 Id. 179. All of the earlier petitions were, of course, premature, but the
petitioners virtually guaranteed themselves the first filing, so long as they did not
run out of petitions.
127 Id.
Attorneys for the American Petroleum Institute (API) recently came up with
another way to stack the odds in their own favor in their race to the courthouse.
OSHA's promulgation of its generic carcinogen standards on January 18, 1980
precipitated a race to the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits by the API and
AFL-CIO respectively. The API won the race, but it may have done so only by
jumping the starting gun. The AFL-CIO asked for transfer to the District of
Columbia on this and other grounds.
Perhaps in order to enhance the chances that the Fifth Circuit would decide
to retain venue, attorneys for API filed three suits in Texas federal district court
challenging the carcinogen standards. When the district court summarily dismissed
the suits on jurisdictional grounds, the Institute appealed the dismissal to the Fifth
Circuit, and then pointed to the pending appeal as a reason militating in favor of
the Fifth Circuit retaining jurisdiction over the challenge to the standards originally
filed in that court. This bootstrapping apparently succeeded because the Fifth
Circuit cited to the pending appeal as one reason in support of its decision to
retain venue. See American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, Nos. 80-3051 et al. (5th
Cir. Sept. 15, 1980) (unpublished order).
Even more distressing than the threat of multiple races is the possibility that
a party will fie a bogus action for emergency relief under the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (1976), before an appeal would otherwise be ripe in an attempt to
establish priority under § 2112(a). Fortunately, the only court in which this ploy
has been attempted has rejected it outright. See American Pub. Gas Ass n v.
FPC, 555 F.2d 852, 856-57 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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D. The Scope of the Agency Action
Section 2112(a) provides for consolidation of appeals from
"the same order" in the circuit in which the first petition was
filed.128 Given the rich variety of agency actions that section
2112(a) attempts to address, its oblique reference to the "same
order" has, not surprisingly, proven unsatisfactory. Because a sin-
gle administrative proceeding can address multiple parties, prod-
ucts, and issues, controversy can arise over whether the result of a
proceeding is a single order or a series of separately issued orders.
1. Single Agency Action
Most agency proceedings are terminated by a single agency
action. Courts appear to be confused about how such actions
should be treated under the "same order" requirement of section
2112(a). For example, in Bristol Laboratories, Inc. v. Richard-
son,129 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) addressed in a
single decertification proceeding "a group of fifteen fixed-com-
bination drugs having common characteristics and subject to com-
mon criticisms" and concluded the proceeding by issuing a single
order.130 American Cyanamid filed the first petition for review in
the First Circuit.131  Bristol filed a later appeal in the Third
Circuit, which was promptly transferred, pursuant to section
2112(a), to the First Circuit. In its motion to have its petition
retransferred to the Third Circuit, Bristol claimed that the FDA
order issued at the conclusion of its proceeding was really several
orders, only one of which was addressed to Bristol and its product.
The court denied the motion, noting its hesitancy "to ignore the
unitary label given the order." 132 The court concluded that
To consider the order atomized because of its application
to several products, although those products are substan-
tially similar in composition and therapeutic theory and
their use presented a common problem dealt with in a sin-
gle decertification proceeding, does not appear to comport
with either the letter or spirit of § 2112(a).
33
128 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1976). See note 6 supra for full statutory text.
The "same order" requirement, a condition precedent to the invocation of the
first-to-file rule of § 2112(a), should be distinguished from the "similar proceedings"
branch of the alternatively available discretionary transfer mechanism. See text
accompanying notes 169-71 infra.
129 456 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1971).
130 Id. 565.
'3' See American Cyanamid Co. v. Richardson, 456 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1971).




By contrast, the court in Far East Conference v. FMC 134 re-
fused to accept the agency's definition of the scope of its order. In
that case the Federal Maritime Commission, as part of a generic
proceeding concerning a "Foreign Trade Study," issued several
identical orders requesting information from the various maritime
freight conferences. The first challenges to the Commission's au-
thority to issue the orders were filed in the Ninth Circuit. Later
appeals were filed in the District of Columbia Circuit. The Com-
mission moved to transfer the appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the
ground that the petitions were for review of the same order. The
District of Columbia Circuit denied the motion, stating only that
"the orders themselves cannot be considered the 'same order' within
the meaning of the statute." 1-
The results in Bristol Laboratories and Far East Conference
are difficult to reconcile. That the former involved a unitary order
while the latter involved, as a formal matter, multiple orders is a
distinction without a difference. Courts generally look to the sub-
stance of the agency action when determining whether or not such
action constitutes the "same order" under section 2112(a); '3. the
orders issued in Far East Conference were absolutely identical ex-
cept for the target party's name. While Bristol Laboratories repre-
sents a salutary attempt by a court to avoid wasting judicial and
client resources, the court in Far East Conference, by adhering to
an extremely narrow definition of "same order," decided to forego a
similar opportunity.
2. Successive Agency Actions
Agencies can issue many appealable final orders during the
course of a single proceeding or related proceedings. If, at the end
of the proceedings, no separate appeals have been taken, the courts
are likely to characterize the final order that concludes the proceed-
ing as a single order subject to review in a single court.1 37  Simi-
larly, when two orders have emanated from two formally separate
and unrelated proceedings, they probably will not be characterized
as a "single order." 138
134 337 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991 (1965).
3 Id. 148 n.1.
136 See notes 137-49 infra & accompanying text
' 3 7 See American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 486 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("The several orders issued in the course of that proceeding represent the
staggered implementation of a single, multi-faceted agency undertakdng.").
238 See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1975) (order
setting rate of return for AT&T and later order rejecting proposed increase because
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Even these reasonably straightforward rules, however, are often
difficult to apply to the remarkable diversity of appealable agency
actions. In BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle,139 for example, the
EPA, pursuant to a court order, 40 had issued proposed regulations
establishing effluent limitations guidelines for the pesticides indus-
try. Because of the pressure of the court order, EPA made the
proposed regulations effective immediately, but subject to change
after comment from interested parties. The proposed regulations
were therefore in effect final interim regulations. Several com-
panies petitioned for review of the proposed regulations; the first
petition was filed in the First Circuit. Approximately two years
later, EPA published final regulations, which amended the proposed
regulations in many respects. One pesticide company filed a peti-
tion for review of the final regulations in the Fifth Circuit. The
First Circuit petitioner then simply amended its complaint to in-
clude the final regulations. Relying on dicta from the District of
Columbia Circuit,14' the First Circuit held that sequential regula-
tions should be considered the same order if they arise from the
"same or interrelated proceedings." 142 Because the EPA proceed-
ings met that test, the court held that the two orders, even though
separated by two years, were in fact the same order. The First
Circuit was therefore the circuit of the first filed petition.
Although the courts have not been entirely consistent, 43 the
BASF Wyandotte "same or interrelated proceedings" test adequately
characterizes the holdings in cases in which the prior successive
order is pending in a court of appeals at the time the second order
is issued. 4 When one court has already disposed of an appeal
it would result in higher rate of return than first order allowed are not the "same
order"; however, case transferred under court's "inherent power" to transfer).
139 582 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1978).
140 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393
(D.D.C. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle,
568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
14 1 See Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
142 582 F.2d at 112.
143 Compare Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 362 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.
1966) (court refuses to retain appeal from order regulating all cable television
systems when petitions to review order regulating only microwave cable television
systems are presently pending before the court) with Midwest Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 364 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (court transfers appeal from board plan to
regulate cable television to circuit in which petitions for review of previously issued
narrow rules on the same subject matter are currently pending).
144 See Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976) (court refuses to transfer petition for review of
denial of fairness doctrine complaint to circuit reviewing previously issued generic
fairness doctrine report because no clear showing made that the two proceedings
are sufficiently interrelated). The court in Public Serv. Conim'n v. FP, 472 F.2d
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from one of two or more successive orders in a single proceeding,
however, the courts typically require the parties to run a new race,
even if the orders are very closely related. 45 American Civil
Liberties Union v. FCC 146 is an excellent example. In the course
of protracted proceedings concerning cable television, the Com-
mission issued numerous appealable orders. The American Civil
Liberties Union (AGLU) petitioned for review of a June 26, 1972
order, and the District of Columbia Circuit summarily disposed of
that appeal on April 6, 1973.147 On April 2, 1973, the ACLU peti-
tioned for review of apparently another aspect of the June 26, 1972
order and of a January 31, 1973 order which terminated the entire
proceeding. Although another party had won the race for review
of the January 31, 1973 order in the Ninth Circuit, the ACLU
argued that the June 26 order was the "same order" for purposes
of section 2112(a). The court disagreed, holding that "[ilt is not
possible to consolidate a pending petition with one involved in
litigation which has ended." 148 On the other hand, the court held
that the June 26, 1972 and January 31, 1973 orders were the same
order for purposes of deciding issues that remained open after the
first appeal. The court, therefore, ordered transfer to the circuit in
which the first petition for review of the January 31, 1973 order
had been filed, despite the fact that no appeal from the June 26,
1972 order had been filed in that circuit. Thus, the court took a
liberal view toward combining pending successive orders into a
single order for purposes of section 2112(a), but refused to combine
two successive orders when an appeal from one of them had already
been decided.1
49
1270 (D.C. Cir. 1972) articulated a very narrow test for the term "interrelated":
"[T]he 'interrelated' term refers to an organic relation in what may fairly be called
a single 'total proceeding' and not merely similarity of legal issues." Id. 1272 n.4.
But cf. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1975) (court
indicates that order granting individual rate increase and previous order setting
overall rate of return could be "same order" under § 2 112(a); court transfers under
its inherent powers).
145 One court has hinted at a possible exception to this general rule in situa-
tions in which a petition is "brought for review of an order entered after remand."
Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However,
the only direct precedent is equivocal. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 272
F.2d 510 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (circuit court has discretion to either transfer or hear
the case).
146486 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.
v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 391 U.S.
461 (1968); Far East Conference v. CAB, 337 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 991 (1964).
147National Ass'n of Theater Owners v. FCC, 477 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
148 486 F.2d at 414.
149 The Ninth Circuit retained jurisdiction over the petition that had been
transferred to it and decided that case even after it had remanded the first insti-
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E. Discretionary Transfer
Courts have broad authority under section 2112(a) to transfer a
case to any other circuit "[f]or the convenience of the parties in
the interest of justice." 150 Courts have also spoken of an "inherent
power" to transfer to a more appropriate circuit.151 In addition to
pressing for transfer because of an allegedly unfair race, litigants
have argued that courts should order discretionary transfer because
another circuit is more convenient, because another circuit is more
affected by the agency ruling, or because other orders from the same
or similar administrative proceeding are pending in or have been
decided by another circuit. Only the latter two arguments have
met with much success in the courts of appeals.
5 2
tuted proceedings to the Commission. See American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC,
523 F.2d 1344, 1346 (9th Cir. 1975).
15028 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1976).
As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is not clear exactly how the phrases
"for the convenience of the parties" and "in the interest of justice" interrelate.
As a starting point, it can be safely stated that the two phrases should not be read
disjunctively. Such a reading would permit a court to order a transfer that would
be convenient but not in the interests of justice. See S. REP'. No. 2129, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3996. But beyond
this, it is questionable whether one criterion is primary to the other. At least one
judge has argued that transfer may be effected only for convenience; the justice
requirement serves merely to provide a reason not to transfer. See Industrial Union
Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 979 & nn.4, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Fahy, J., dis-
senting). Most courts, however, appear to feel that the convenience requirement
limits the "in the interests of justice" requirement. See notes 154-55 infra &
accompanying text. Thus, as long as a transfer was not inconvenient to a party,
a court could order a transfer solely "in the interest of justice."
'
5 1 See note 88 supra.
152The author has discovered twenty-two published or otherwise reported
opinions in which a court has been asked to transfer pursuant to its "inherent
power" or pursuant to the "in the interest of justice for the convenience of the
parties" provision of § 2112(a). ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621
F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1980); International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers
v. NLRB, 610 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Southland Mower Co. v. CPSC, 600
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1979); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir.
1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Industrial
Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977); American Pub. Gas
Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Public Interest Research Group v.
FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976); American
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1975); Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
481 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1973); Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 476 F.2d 907 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Munici-
pal Distribs. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1972); J.L. Simmons Co.
v. NLRB, 425 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1970); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d
892 (4th Cir. 1967); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770 (2d
Cir. 1967), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 391 U.S. 461 (1968); J.P. Stevens
& Co. v. NLRB, No. 11,246 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 1967) (unpublished order) (dis-
cussed in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1967)) ("Stevens
II"); International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Midwest
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 364 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Insurance Workers Int'l
Union v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB,
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1. Convenience of the Parties
The convenience of the parties is explicitly included in section
2112(a) as a consideration for discretionary transfer.153 Yet while
the parties have occasionally urged that transfer to another court
would be more convenient, 154 no court has transferred on this basis
alone.155 Because each party can usually make a reasonably plausible
argument that the circuit of its choice is most convenient, 56 it is
not surprising that the courts have not made convenience a major
factor in transfer decisions. Indeed, one pragmatic court has recog-
nized that "[t]he only significant convenience factor which affects
petitioners seeking review of rulemaking on an agency record is
the convenience of counsel who will brief and argue the peti-
354 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Far East Conference v. FMC, 337 F.2d 146 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 991 (1965).
In 11 of those cases transfer was ordered. In one case the court apparently
transferred because it was concerned about the fairness of the agency's procedures
for beginning the race. Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C.
Cir. 1977). In two cases, the court transferred because it held the first-filing party
insufficiently aggrieved by the agency action to have its choice of forum. J.L. Sim-
mons Co. v. NLRB, 425 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1970); Insurance Workers Int'l Union
v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In the remaining eight cases the court
transferred because another petition from the same or similar case had been pre-
viously filed or decided. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir.
1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); American
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1975); Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
481 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1973); Municipal Distribs. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367
(D.C. Cir. 1972); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, No. 11,246 (4th Cir. Apr. 10,
1967) (unpublished order) (discussed in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d
892 (4th Cir. 1967)) ("Stevens Ir'); Midwest Television, Inc. v. FCC, 364 F.2d
674 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
One should be cautious in interpreting this tabulation, however, because it
reflects only those transfers that resulted in published opinions or were otherwise
reported.
15328 U.S.C. §2112(a) (1976). See also 28 U.S.C. § 14 04(a) (1976).
154 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979);
Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 9.65 (D.C. Cir. 1979); American
Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
155 While no court has transferred to another circuit on the basis of convenience
alone, the District of Columbia Circuit cited the convenience of the parties as a
reason for refusing to transfer in a case involving simultaneous filings. American
Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also ITT World
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621 F.2d 1201, 1208 (2d Cir. 1980). However, in
Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a case in
which three separate opinions were filed, the court transferred the case to the
Fifth Circuit, despite opinions by two of the three judges that the District of
Columbia Circuit was the most convenient.
156For example, in United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 697 (3d
Cir. 1979), the Lead Industries Association argued that the Fifth Circuit was more
convenient than the Third Circuit because a large number of employers who were
aggrieved by OSHA's lead standard were located in the Fifth Circuit. The United
Steelworkers replied that 15,000 of its members worked in plants in the Third
Circuit. The court quite justifiably declined to decide which of the two circuits
'was the most convenient for the parties.
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tions." 157 Given the universal use of air travel and long distance
telecommunications, it is unlikely that arguing an appeal before a
distant court will be significantly inconvenient for counsel. Nor
are the additional expenses associated with such travel a significant
portion of the cost of an appeal from administrative rulemaking.1rs
2. Regional Impact of the Agency Action
Parties in a few cases have urged discretionary transfer on the
ground that one circuit is more "affected" by the agency action
than another.' 9 No court has ordered transfer solely on this
ground, although it has apparently played some role in two NLRB
unfair labor practice cases. 10 Courts have recognized that it is
usually difficult to pinpoint a region that is more affected by a
federal administrative action than another,161 and they understand-
ably have been reluctant to initiate threshold inquiries into this
essentially factual question in deciding whether to use their dis-
cretionary transfer power.
3. Comparative Aggrievement
Later-filing parties have in numerous cases contended that the
first-filing party was not sufficiently "aggrieved" by the agency ac-
tion to be entitled to its choice of forum, and they have urged the
courts to exercise their discretionary power to transfer to the
"more aggrieved" party's circuit. Although the courts have stated
157 Id.
158 See 16 Wmorrr AN MILLE, supra note 4, § 3944, at 339; Carrington,
supra note 74, at 608; Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 8; Fels, supra note 85,
at 45.
159 See International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 610
F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979); American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852,
858 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir.
1973); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPG, 472 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1972); J.P. Stevens
& Co. v. NLRB, No. 11,246 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 1967) (unpublished order) (dis-
cussed in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1967)) ("Stevens
II').
160 See Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1973); J.P. Stevens
& Co. v. NLRB, No. 11,246 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 1967) (unpublished order) (dis-
cussed in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1967)). ("Stevens
II'). But see International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB,
610 F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
161 See United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 697 (3d Cir. 1979);
American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852, 859 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Although the courts
have not been favorably disposed toward regional impact as a transfer criterion,
Congress has been urged to include it explicitly as a criterion. See notes 269-77
and 304-05 infra & accompanying text.
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in dicta that "a party's selection of forum is [not] necessarily con-
trolling if it has received substantially all of the relief contem-
plated," 162 they have ordered transfer on this basis in only two
cases.' 63  In one of them, Insurance Workers International Union
v. NLRB, 1' the union challenged the Board's unit designation on
two grounds: (1) that it did not include fire insurance agents, and
(2) that the Board should have compelled the employer to accept
and abide by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement that
would have been entered into had the employer bargained in good
faith. After holding oral argument and probing the record deeply
for evidence on the question, the court rejected the union's first
contention because it was factually incorrect. It rejected the
union's second argument because it was so speculative that the
Board probably would have lacked authority to decide it. The
court therefore transferred the case to the Seventh Circuit so that
that court could rule on the employer's claim on the merits that
all the insurance workers were in fact independent contractors.
Interestingly, the court refused to dismiss the union's claims on
standing grounds; the court opined that the Seventh Circuit should
have an independent opportunity to probe the union's aggrieve-
ment.16 5
Few courts, however, have been as eager as the Insurance
Workers court to probe the record on the aggrievement question
in making the threshold decision whether to transfer. More re-
cently, courts have cautioned that "[t]he possibility of a transfer on
this ground is not to be taken as permitting a trial by affidavit on
the issue of motivation." 166 It would seem particularly wasteful of
1
6 2 International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
3
63 J.L. Simmons Co. v. NLRB, 425 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1970); Insurance Work-
ers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Ithaca Col-
lege v. NLBE, 623 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the Second Circuit speculated
about the District of Columbia Circuit's stand on the relative aggrievement test for
discretionary transfer.
164 360 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
165 The only other case in which transfer was ordered because of the first-
filing party was insufficiently aggrieved is J.L. Simmons Co. v. NLRB, 425 F.2d
52 (9th Cir. 1970), in which the employer challenged the Board's order requiring
the union to cease and desist from its secondary boycott. Although the Board gave
the employer all the relief that it requested, it declined to rule on one of the
employer's contentions, because such a ruling was unnecessary to decide the case.
Without finding that the employer was not an "aggrieved party" within the mean-
ing of the judicial review section of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (1976), the court ruled that the employer's aggrievement did not war-
rant allowing it to choose the forum for appeal.
166 International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
See also International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 610 F.2d
956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 696
(3d Cir. 1979) ("Certainly the reference to 'the interest of justice' in § 2 112(a)
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valuable judicial resources to address one party's aggrievement ex-
tensively in a threshold transfer proceeding and then leave the
aggrievement question open for re-resolution after transfer. In-
deed, one year after Insurance Workers was decided, the District
of Columbia Circuit limited its use of the comparative aggrievement
factor to "the special case where the 'inconsequential' character of
the deficiency in findings or relief is established by the petitioner's
own stipulation . . . or other pleading or representation." 167 Un-
der this narrow test the courts, not surprisingly, have refused to
order transfer in the vast majority of cases. 168
4. Same or Similar Proceedings in Another Circuit
In eight of the eleven reported cases in which the courts have
ordered discretionary transfer, they have done so because the trans-
feree circuit had previously decided a case arising out of the same
or similar administrative proceeding or involving the same or
similar issues. 169 As previously discussed,170 courts can order trans-
fer to another court in which a petition from the same or similar
was not intended to require such a preliminary examination of the merits."); Truck
Drivers & Helpers Local 728 v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 643, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Ball v. NLRB, 299 F.2d 683, 689 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 838 (1962).
167 International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
See also Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(recognizing the possibility of transfer because of insufficient aggrievement, but
limiting it to the same "special case" as International Union, UAW). See also
United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[C]ourt
have limited the inquiry into the respective merits of the petitions to a determina-
tion whether the petitioning party's claim of aggrievement is so frivolous or insub-
stantial as to undercut the assumption of a good faith petition for review.").
168 See International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 610
F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693
(3d Cir. 1979) (transfer granted on other grounds); American Pub. Gas Ass'n v.
FPC, 555 F.2d 852, 858 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB,
476 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 728 v. NLRB,
386 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1967); International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 373 F.2d
671 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Ball v. NLRB, 299 F.2d 683, 689 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 838 (1962).
One court, however, has cited relative aggrievement as a reason for denying
a motion for transfer. See ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621 F.2d
1201, 1208 (2d Cir. 1980).
169 United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979); Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1978); American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1975); Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481
F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1973); Municipal Distribs. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367
(D.C. Cir. 1972); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, No. 11, 246 (4th Cir. Apr. 10,
1967) (unpublished order) (discussed in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d
892, 894 (4th Cir. 1967)) ("Stevens II"); Midwest Television, Inc. v. FCC, 364
F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
170 See notes 137-49 supra & accompanying text.
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administrative order has been filed, but not decided, by broadly
interpreting the term "same order." A court's determination that
two orders are not the "same order," however, does not end the
matter, because the court receiving the first petition in the second
race may still order discretionary transfer.171 The courts appear
to agree that "one circuit's familiarity with the issues and parties
from prior litigation" 172 and "the need for continuity and con-
sistency in reviewing a series of agency decisions" 117 are factors
that should be considered in deciding whether discretionary trans-
fer is appropriate, but they also disavow any theory of "specializa-
tion of tribunals." .74 Unfortunately, the courts have been unable
to articulate and consistently follow a single rule for striking the
delicate balance between judicial economy and generalist courts.
The District of Columbia Circuit made the first attempt to
state such a rule in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB.'7 5 In that
case, the First Circuit had twice remanded a Civil Aeronautics
Board order denying Northeast Airlines a renewal of its certificate
for an East Coast-Florida route. In response to the second remand,
the agency on April 26, 1965 reopened the East Coast-Florida pro-
ceedings to reconsider entirely the number of carriers that should
be allowed on that route and who those carriers should be. The
First Circuit, noting that the Board's action went beyond that
court's second remand, relinquished jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the
other two carriers that owned certificates for the route filed a peti-
tion in the District of Columbia Circuit to review the April 26
order. Because the First Circuit had already issued its opinions
with respect to the first two agency orders, the District of Columbia
Circuit could not rely upon the "same order" rule to order
transfer to the First Circuit. 7 6 Nevertheless, the court ordered
17 1 See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1975) (court
declines to decide "same order" question, but orders discretionary transfer).
172 Abourezk v. FPC, 513 F.2d 504, 505 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
173 Id.
174 See International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 610
F.2d 956, 963 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United Steelworkers v. Marshall ,592 F.2d
693, 697 (3d Cir. 1979); American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852, 857-58
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1271-72 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Midwest Television, Inc. v. FCC, 364 F.2d 674, 675 (D.C. Cir.
1966). But cf. Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1063
(Ist Cir. 1975) (speaking of the "special familiarity of the D.C. Circuit with
communications problems").
175 354 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
276 See note 145 supra & accompanying text. Indeed, because neither of the
District of Columbia petitioners had its domicile or principal place of business in
the First Circuit, the First Circuit did not even have proper venue. 354 F.2d
at 510.
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discretionary transfer, pointing out that the First Circuit was
"familiar with the background of the controversy." 177 The court
stated that section 2112(a) "should be liberally applied to permit
review by a single court of closely related matters where appropriate
for sound judicial administration." "Is Other circuits have fol-
lowed this "familiar with the background of the controversy" test to
varying degrees. 179
More recently, however, the District of Columbia Circuit has
signaled a change in approach. In Public Service Commission v.
FPC,180 that circuit refused to transfer a petition for review of a
East Texas Area natural gas rate proceeding to the Fifth Circuit,
despite the gas producers' contention that the case and a rate pro-
ceeding just reviewed by the Fifth Circuit raised common questions
of law and closely related questions of fact.181 Four years later, in
American Public Gas Association v. FPC,8s2 the District of Colum-
bia and Fifth Circuits received simultaneous petitions to review
the second of FPC's nationwide natural gas rate proceedings. The
177 354 F.2d at 510.
1781d. 511. See also Municipal Distribs. Group v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Midwest Television, Inc. v. FCC, 364 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
179 See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322, 327 (2d Cir. 1975)
(court orders transfer of proceeding on individual rate hikes to court hearing ap-
peal from proceeding prescribing a rate of return for AT&T; court notes that the
transferee circuit is "intimately familiar with the background of this controversy");
Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1973) (court orders dis-
cretionary transfer of unfair labor practice case to court that had previously decided
cases arising out of the same union organizational drive; court says that the trans-
feree court is "familiar with the background of this case"). But see Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 1967) (refusing to order
discretionary transfer of appeal from order permitting international "inclusive tours"
to court that had recently decided that the board lacked authority to authorize
national "inclusive tours"; court refers to the "very unusual circumstances" of the
earlier case); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1967) (having
already transferred one order to court reviewing previous order arising out of the
same union organizational effort, court refuses to order discretionary transfer of
two subsequent orders).
180 472 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
181 The court had to contend with a factually similar case decided in the op-
posite manner only four months earlier. In Municipal Distribs. Group v. FPC,
459 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1972), a District of Columbia Circuit panel transferred
an order arising out of the Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding to the Fifth
Circuit because that court was "familiar with the background of the controversy"
through its review of a previous FPC order involving the same proceeding. Id.
1368. The Public Service Commission court distinguished Municipal Distributors
on the basis of a fact which the Municipal Distributors court expressly refused to
rely upon-that the Fifth Circuit petition in the latter case had been time-stamped
two seconds earlier than the District of Columbia Circuit petition. See Public
Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d at 1273; Municipal Distribs. Group v. FPC, 459
F.2d at 1368.
182 555 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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Fifth Circuit had recently decided the appeal from the first such
proceeding. Declining to transfer, the District of Columbia Circuit
pointed out that "general familiarity with the legal questions pre-
sented by a case is decidedly different from acquaintance with the
proceedings that gave rise to the order in suit." 183
These more recent cases indicate that the District of Colum-
bia Circuit has abandoned the "familiar with the background of
the controversy" test and adopted instead a narower standard, first
articulated in Public Service Commission. Under this new test,
a court should transfer only where "the same or inter-related pro-
ceeding was previously under review in a court of appeals, and is
now brought for review of an order entered after remand, or in
a follow-on phase, where continuance of the same appellate tri-
bunal is necessary 'to maintain continuity in the total proceed-
ing.' " 184
There appears to be little difference between the new Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit standard and the "same or interrelated
proceedings" test that has evolved in the "same order" cases pre-
viously discussed.'85 At least in those circumstances in which the
first order has not been the subject of a final judicial opinion,' s
it is difficult to imagine a case in which two orders would not be
the "same order" but would be subject to discretionary transfer on
the basis of the similarity of the proceedings under the District
of Columbia Circuit test.187 The test probably has its greatest appli-
183 Id. 857. The court relegated the Municipal Distributors case, see note 181
supra, to a footnote. 555 F.2d at 858 n.5.
The author believes that Public Service Commission and American Public Gas
Association were rightly decided. The fact that one court has already decided a
case involving similar factual or legal questions is no reason to transfer that case,
regardless of the additional expertise that three judges of that circuit might possess.
The complaint here is with the failure of the District of Columbia Circuit to over-
rule Municipal Distributors and limit Eastern Air Lines to its peculiar facts.
184 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 282 F.2d 510, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).
185 See notes 137-46 supra & accompanying text. The "same or interrelated
proceeding" test that has evolved in the "same order" cases actually has its origin
in Public Service Commission. The court in BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle,
582 F.2d 108, 112 (1st Cir. 1978), quoted the Public Service Commission test
for discretionary transfers as the test for deciding whether two or more orders are
the "same order" for purposes of § 2112(a). Hence, there should indeed be very
little difference between the two tests.
180 See text accompanying note 145 supra.
187 The only relevant case is American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322
(2d Cir. 1975), in which the FCC denied an individual rate increase to AT&T
based on a previous order setting a general rate of return for that company. A
petition for review of the prior order was pending in the District of Columbia
Circuit. Declining to hold that the two orders were the "same order" under
§ 2112(a), the Second Circuit nevertheless exercised its inherent power to trans-
fer. The court, however, indicated that, if pressed, it would have held the two
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cation to cases in which a court receives the first petition for review
of an order issued in a proceeding in which another court has al-
ready issued an opinion on another order in the same or similar pro-
ceeding. As previously noted, the courts have rarely, if ever,
transferred under the "same order" provision of section 2112(a) in
such a case. 8   The District of Columbia Circuit rule should simi-
larly guarantee that few cases will be transferred from that circuit to
other circuits that have previously decided appeals from the same
or related proceedings.
The other appellate courts have not rallied behind the narrow
"same or interrelated proceedings" test espoused by the District of
Columbia Circuit. 189 Only the First Circuit has shown some inter-
est in it.190 The Third Circuit, on the other hand, has recently
adopted a test that would appear to be more liberal toward transfer
than even the "familiar with the background of the controversy"
test. In United Steelworkers v. Marshall,191 petitions to review
OSHA's lead standard were filed simultaneously in the Third and
Fifth Circuits. Pursuant to an agreement between the judges of
the two circuits, the Third Circuit agreed to determine which court
should decide the merits of the controversy. Rather than accept
jurisdiction or transfer to the Fifth Circuit, the court surprisingly
transferred to the District of Columbia Circuit where no one had
filed a petition for review.192 The court noted that a petition had
orders to be the "same order." The court stated that it viewed AT&T's argument
that the two orders were not the same "as unduly restrictive." Id. 325. The
court pointed out that the proceedings were "closely related," and that the District
of Columbia Circuit was "intimately familiar with the background" of the contro-
versy. Id. 327.
188 See text accompanying notes 145-49 supra.
189 See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 519 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1975);
Farah Mfg. Co. v. NLBB, 481 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1973); note 179 supra.
190 The First Circuit cited the District of Columbia Circuit's "same or inter-
related proceedings" test with approval in BASF Wyandotte v. Costle, 582 F.2d
108, 112 (1st Cir. 1978), in adopting that test for determining whether two suc-
cessive orders were the same order. The First Circuit also cited the District of
Columbia Circuit rule favorably in NLRB v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc., 514 F.2d
475, 476 n.* (1st Cir. 1975), for the unrelated proposition that the circuit in which
the first petition is filed should decide which circuit shduld hear the merits.
Whether that circuit will adopt the same test for deciding whether to order a dis-
cretionary transfer remains to be seen.
191 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979). For a detailed discussion of the case, see
text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
192 Although the court did not address the question of its authority to transfer
to another court in which no petition had been filed, § 2112(a) probably gives it
such authority. That statute allows transfer to "any other court of appeals." 28
U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1976). Indeed, transfer is not even limited to courts in
which venue is otherwise proper: "The breadth of language and vision of § 2112
goes beyond the precipitating evil [forum shopping by agencies], as is made clear
by the final clause permitting transfer for reasons of sound judicial administration,
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been filed in that circuit to review a challenge to EPA's national
ambient air quality standard for lead. Because both the EPA and
OSHA proceedings addressed the health effects of human exposure
to airborne lead, the court reasoned that there was "a strong insti-
tutional interest" in having those issues decided together in the
District of Columbia Circuit.19 3 The court referred to the "desir-
ability of concentrating litigation over closely related issues in the
same forum so as to avoid duplication of judicial effort." 194
It seems clear that the Steelworkers case could not possibly
have been transferred under the District of Columbia Circuit's
"same or interrelated proceedings" test. The OSHA order was not
an order entered on remand of the EPA order, nor was the OSHA
order part of a "follow-on phase" of the EPA order "where con-
tinuance of the same appellate tribunal is necessary 'to maintain
the continuity of the total proceeding.' "195 The two orders were
issued in two entirely separate proceedings by two different agencies
under two different statutes. The only similarity between the two
is that they both resolved similar factual and policy questions con-
cerning the health effects of airborne lead. Yet the answers to
these questions could very well depend upon the language of the
individual statutes. For example, the standard of review under
the Clean Air Act is "arbitrary and capricious," 191 whereas the
Occupational Safety and Health Act standard is "substantial evi-
dence." 1'9 Although the Third Circuit cited judicial economy in
support of its transfer, it is not at all clear that the same District
of Columbia Circuit panel will hear both cases. According to the
notwithstanding objections, to a court which would not have had venue in the
first instance." Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir.
Cir. 1965).
'93 592 F.2d at 698. The court pointed out that the Clean Air Act's provision
for exclusive review of national ambient air quality standards in the District of
Columbia Circuit, 42 U.S.C.A. §7607(b)(1) (Supp. 1980), precluded that cir-
cuit from transferring to the circuit that heard the OSHA appeal.
'94 592 F.2d at 697.
195 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 282 F.2d 510, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).
19642 U.S.C.A. § 7607(d)(9) (Supp. 1980).
19r29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). It has been persuasively argued that these
two standards may not differ in practice when a court is reviewing a rulemaling
record. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973); DeLong,
supra note 42, at 287-89; Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer
Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 899, 934-35 (1973). However, other
subtler differences between the statutes could affect a court's role, especially in
reviewing an agency's resolution of what the author has in another context called
"science policy questions." See McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion
in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens
in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L. J. 729, 792 (1979).
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court in Public Service Commission v. FPC,198 the District of
Columbia Circuit has adopted a system for the selection of judges
that is based on a lottery. The only exception is "for retention of
the same panel that handled an earlier appeal in the same case . . .
but not for reference to a panel that handled a different case on the
basis of similarity of underlying questions." 199 The Steelworkers
facts would not appear to come within this exception.
While the Third Circuit has clearly drawn a broader transfer
test than the "same or interrelated proceedings" test adopted by the
District of Columbia Circuit for cases in which related proceedings
are currently pending in another circuit, it is not clear that the
Third Circuit will extend its broad Steelworkers approach to cases
in which another circuit has already decided a similar or related
case. The court indicated that it would not have transferred to the
District of Columbia Circuit if the EPA case had already been de-
cided when it rejected judicial expertise as a transfer criterion and
stated that "it would be improper to speculate that any circuit
court of appeals is more expert in OSHA matters than another." 200
For the present, it is not clear which view will ultimately prevail.
The Supreme Court has never examined a section 2112(a) case, and
because those cases all involve preliminary skirmishes over which
circuit shall hear a case, that Court is not likely to further delay the
determination of the threshold question by granting certiorari in
such a case.
F. Temporary Stays
The nature of many kinds of administrative action is such that
initial steps toward compliance cannot easily be undone if a court
ultimately overturns the agency's action. Hence, petitioners often
ask courts to stay temporarily the effectiveness of administrative
orders pending appeal. In cases involving races to the courthouse,
a party occasionally must request a stay before the outcome of the
race is determined, and it is not uncommon for a court to issue a
stay before deciding whether to transfer the proceedings to another
circuit.201 This poses many still unanswered questions concerning
the jurisdiction of the transferring court to enforce the stay after
198472 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
"199 Id. 1273.
200 United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 697 (3d Cir. 1979).
2 01 See Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bristol Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Richardson, 456 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1971); Valley Vision, Inc. v.
FCC, 383 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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transfer and the ability of the transferee court to lift the transferring
court's stay. Both dilemmas strain judicial comity.20 2 For example,
in Industrial Union Department v. Bingham,20 3 the Fifth Circuit
issued a temporary stay of OSHA's temporary emergency benzene
standard on May 20, 1977, and set a date of June 6, 1977, for a
hearing to determine whether the stay should be continued for the
duration of the litigation. The union believed that it had filed the
first petition for review in the District of Columbia Circuit, and it
therefore urged the Fifth Circuit to lift the stay and transfer im-
mediately to the District of Columbia Circuit. When the Fifth
Circuit failed to do this, the union asked the District of Columbia
Circuit for an emergency ex parte restraining order to prevent the
Fifth Circuit petitioners from implementing the orders of the Fifth
Circuit or in the alternative to dismiss their case in that circuit.
The District of Columbia Circuit avoided this direct threat to judi-
cial comity by denying the motion. Unfortunately, the court did
not publish an opinion giving its reasons for doing so.204
Perhaps because of the threat to judicial comity, no transferee
court has lifted a transferring court's stay. Petitioners therefore
have an additional incentive to forum shop for temporary stays.
Even if a petitioner loses the race, it can still request the court of
its choice to stay the administrative order pending appeal, and it
can be reasonably confident that the stay will last until some court
decides the merits of the controversy.
G. Simultaneous Filings
As the races to the courthouse have intensified it has become
increasingly difficult for the courts of appeals to pick the winners.
Although some courts still insist upon having a winner, even if that
requires findings accurate to the hundredth of a second,205 other
courts have recognized the artificiality of such findings and have
proceeded on the assumption that two petitions filed within seconds
202 See notes 50-58 supra & accompanying text.
203 570 F.2d 965, 974 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (opinion of Wilkey, J.).
204 See also Valley Vision, Inc. v. FCC, 383 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1967), in
which the District of Columbia Circuit, in order to preserve judicial comity, trans-
ferred a proceeding to the Ninth Circuit (which had already issued a stay), despite
the former circuit's conviction that it had exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions to
review the type of FCC order under challenge.
205 See text accompanying notes 97-103 supra. See also Southland Mower
Co. v. CPSC, 600 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1979); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 509 F.2d 176,
179 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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of one another are in fact simultaneous filings.20 6  Recent admin-
istrative regulations that set a particular time in the future at which
agency orders become ripe for judicial review 207 should eliminate
races and ensure that petitions are filed in different courts within
milliseconds of one another, thus frustrating even further the strict
adherents to the first-to-file rule.208 Yet as the first-to-file rule has
been abandoned in tight races, new problems have surfaced in the
practice under section 2112(a).
When faced with virtually simultaneous filings, those courts
that do not insist upon declaring a winner have proceeded directly
to the question of discretionary transfer.20 9  This solution, how-
ever, does not solve the threshold problem of determining which
court shall decide the discretionary transfer question. The courts
have apparently adopted the practice, first announced in Ameri-
can Public Gas Association v. FPC,210 of resolving this question
through informal telephone conversations between the judges of
the circuits. The advantage of this approach is its speed and
efficiency. The disadvantage is its secrecy. The judges decide upon
the circuit that will decide the discretionary transfer question with-
out the benefit of briefs or oral arguments; they have no announced
criteria to guide their discretion; and they do not have to justify
the result. On the other hand, because the process only deter-
mines which court shall determine the proper court to decide the
merits, this may well be one of those trivial areas where the im-
portance of the issue cannot justify greater procedural formality.
206 See United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979); Ameri-
can Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Municipal Distribs.
Group v. FPC, 459" F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1972); International Union of Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 343 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
207 See note 17, supra.
208 Interestingly, in the only case in which there has been a race under the
recent agency "race-to-the-courthouse" designations the court still insisted that a
winner be picked. In Southland Mower Co. v. CPSC, 600 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1979), the Fifth Circuit upheld the Consumer Product Safety Commission's deter-
mination that its order would be ripe for judicial review at 12:00 noon, Eastern
Standard Time, on February 26, 1979. The court, however, found that the Fifth
Circuit petitioner filed approximately one minute prior to the District of Columbia
Circuit petitioner.
EPA has suggested that races may still be possible under its "race-to-the-
courthouse" regulations if racers utilized "atomic chronometers synchronized to
the clock at Greenwich." Final EPA Race Regulations, supra note 17, at 26,407.
209United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979); American
Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Municipal Distribs. Group
v. FPC, 459 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But cf. International Union of Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 343 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (one of two
simultaneous petitions transferred to Second Circuit because NLRB planned to
petition for enforcement of the contested orders in that circuit).
210555 F.2d 852, 861 app. C (D.C. Cir. 1976). See United Steelworkers v.
Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 695 (3d Cir. 1979).
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In any event, recent judicial experience with simultaneous filings
does suggest the need for establishing some agreed-upon mechanism
for deciding which court shall identify the court that will decide
the merits of the controversy.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. The Need for Reform
The preceding analysis of current practices under section
2112 (a) reveals several strengths and weaknesses of the first-to-file
rule. The rule has succeeded reasonably well at preserving ju-
dicial comity 211-the courts have been faithful to the rule, and
one court has even transferred to the court of first filing despite
its conviction that it had exclusive jurisdiction.212 Yet while strict
adherence to the mechanical rule has in the past avoided unseemly
judicial conflicts, the recent spate of simultaneous filings may resur-
rect that possibility in the future. The informal conference
mechanism may break down as more agencies promulgate race-to-
the-courthouse rules and thereby guarantee more numerous simul-
taneous filings in several circuits.
Section 2112(a) also retains the percolation and signaling 213 ad-
vantages of forum shopping. Even though the agency cannot shop,
a sympathetic, but aggrieved public interest group can still win
the race to a "friendly" court. Indeed, several of the important
recent Supreme Court decisions in the environmental and occupa-
tional safety and health fields would probably not have been de-
cided but for intercircuit disputes that signaled the Court of the
need to grant certiorari. 214 However, the recent Third Circuit
practice of ordering discretionary transfer of cases to circuits that
are deciding "closely related" questions 215 may, if followed by
other circuits, reduce this advantage somewhat.
These advantages of the current first-to-file mechanism do not
come without great costs. Section 2112(a) exacerbates the adverse
effects that forum shopping can have on the public image of law-
years and courts.216 The thought that lawyers sometimes base
211 See notes 50-58 supra & accompanying text.
212 Valley Vision, Inc. v. FCC, 383 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But see note
59 supra.
213 See notes 78-82 supra & accompanying text.
214 See note 67 supra.
215 See notes 191-99 supra & accompanying text.
216 See note 49 supra & accompanying text.
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their choice of forums on their assessments of the pre-existing ju-
dicial biases 217 and the sight of attorneys scrambling madly to im-
plement their choices might tarnish the carefully cultivated image
of the bar and subject its members to public ridicule.
The apparent inability of some agencies to initiate a fair race
with an agreed-upon starting point can likewise undermine the in-
tegrity of the administrative and judicial review process. While
the agencies can justifiably bear some of the blame for unequal
races, 218 much of the apparent unfairness of agency and court
attempts to implement section 2112 (a) is attributable to basic
incompatibilities between the administrative process and the race
concept. Many aspects of the administrative process are open-
ended. A single proceeding can sire many orders, all of which may
be ripe for appeal, but none of which may be a firm end-point
from which a definitive race can be clocked. While it may seem
unfair for the petitioner that challenged EPA's final regulation in
BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle 219 to learn that the race it had
recently completed had ended two years previously, it does vio-
lence to the continuous character of the administrative process to
insist, as that petitioner did, that EPA's interim rules were so un-
related to its final rules that review in different courts was war-
ranted. In reality, both sets of rules were part of a continuing
evaluation, prescribed by statute, of EPA's technology-based stand-
ards for the pesticides industry. This process began in 1974 when
EPA was ordered by a court to promulgate "best practicable tech-
nology" effluent limitations for the pesticides industry,220 and it
will not end until 1981 or later when EPA promulgates final "best
available technology economically achievable" regulations for that
industry. This is not to say that there are not interim steps along
the way at which EPA's actions are properly subject to judicial
scrutiny; it does, however, suggest that the potential for unfairness
and absurdity is high in a forum selection process that presumes
that the administrative process yields discrete units of reviewable
information.
Because it allows private petitioners to forum shop, section
2112(a) does nothing to discourage the threat that forum shopping
2 17 See notes 41-42 supra & accompanying text.
218 OSHA surely must take the blame for the badly bungled race in Industrial
Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See text accompanying
notes 20-34 and 115-19 supra.
219 582 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1979). See notes 139-44 supra & accompanying
text.




poses to the uniform application of administrative legal and policy
decisions.221 Congress enacted section 2112(a) with an eye towards
checking the NLRB's perceived attempts at shopping for a favor-
able forum for review of its unfair labor practice determinations.
222
National standard setting was not involved, and hence no particu-
lar need for uniformity existed. Yet the punishment meted out
to the NLRB continues to plague the national standard-setting
processes of agencies that did not even exist when the NLRB com-
mitted its alleged transgressions. While section 2112 (a) may not
leave the courts powerless to consider, in ordering or refusing dis-
cretionary transfer, the effects that an adverse ruling from the
transferee court might have on the agency's attempt to implement
a national program, no court has yet explicitly listed this as a fac-
tor in its deliberations.2 23  Fortunately, the courts have at least
refused to encourage regionalistic attacks on national uniformity
by declining to consider which region might be most affected in
ordering discretionary transfer.
224
For the same reasons that section 2112(a) fails to encourage the
uniform implementation of national programs, that section does
little to reduce the business uncertainty that forum shopping can
cause.2 25  For issues on which the entire business world is united
in its opposition to an agency's position, section 2112(a) does in-
crease business certainty by preventing the agency from forum shop-
ping. However, this aspect of section 2112(a) has limited value in
regulatory areas, such as route allocations, that involve interbusiness
rivalry or in cases in which public interest groups take the position
that the agency has not done enough to protect their interests.
While one can imagine more expensive ways to channel forum
shopping, section 2112(a)'s race-to-the-courthouse approach does not
come cheaply.226 The races themselves can be quite expensive.
The greatest cost, however, is in the resources expended in threshold
litigation over the timing of the starting gun, the outcome of the
race, the scope a single or successive orders under the "same
order" provision, and the advisability of discretionary transfer.
Hundreds of hours of attorney and court time have been wasted in
221 See notes 60-73 supra & accompanying text.
222 See Comment, Forum-Shopping in the Review of NLRB Orders, 28 U.
Cmr. L. REV. 552, 557 n25 (1961).
223 One court has spoken, however, of "the need for continuity and consistency
in reviewing a series of agency decisions." Abourezk v. FPC, 513 F.2d 504, 505
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
224 See note 161 supra & accompanying text.
22 - See notes 74-75 supra & accompanying text.
226 See notes 76-77 and 104-06 supra & accompanying text.
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threshold litigation with no conceivable corresponding benefits to
society.
In sum, while section 2112(a) has retained the chief advantages
of forum shopping, it has exacerabated many of its disadvantages.
Moreover, that section has spawned a whole body of threshold liti-
gation that did not exist prior to its enactment. Reform therefore
seems advisable. Indeed, the trend toward promulgating race-to-
the-courthouse regulations may make reform inevitable. However,
in assessing proposals for reform, one must not lose sight of the
magnitude of the problem. Forum shopping under section 2112(a)
is not a legal problem of such major significance that it alone can
justify large-scale tinkering with the currently existing system for
judicial review of administrative action. Fortunately, less ambitious
reforms can eliminate or greatly reduce most of the disadvantages of
forum shopping while retaining most of the advantages.
B. Patch and Repair
Before advocating wholesale institutional change, or even minor
statutory reform, one ought to explore possible corrective actions
within the present judicial and administrative framework of section
2112(a). This section of the Article examines several available re-
forms and assesses the likelihood that they can be successfully im-
plemented. It concludes that several possible administrative reforms
can offer some improvement in the current section 2112(a) practice
and that these reforms can be implemented rather easily. Reforms
on a scale necessary to improve significantly the forum shopping
problem, however, must await congressional action.
1. Judicial Patch and Repair
a. Penalties for Racing
While section 2112(a) does not discourage races, the courts could
easily do so by consistently ordering discretionary transfer to the
circuit of the later-filed petition whenever they suspect that the
first-filed petition was the result of a race. This easily imposed
judicial remedy could reduce or eliminate many of the disadvantages
of forum shopping while preserving the system's capacity for "per-
colation" and for signaling the Supreme Court. Moreover, such
transfer might be justified as "in the interest of justice."
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While penalizing racers seems to be, at first glance, an attractive
technique for remedying section 2112(a)'s weaknesses, it has several
failings. First, it runs directly contrary to Congress's resolution of
the forum shopping problem. Congress clearly saw the discretion-
ary transfer provision of section 2112(a) as an exception to the first-
to-file rule, not as an alternative mechanism that would one day
supplant the rule entirely. Courts that transferred every petition
resulting from a race would be effectively writing the first-to-file
rule out of the statute.227 It is also questionable whether the "in
the interest of justice" rationale would support the penalizing of all
racers. A relatively inexpensive race conducted in an unobtrusive
manner between parties equally able to afford the cost is unjust to
no private party, and has little harmful impact on society as a whole.
The most significant infirmity of the penalty approach, how-
ever, is that it probably would not work. Automatic transfer of
petitions that appeared to result from races would change the nature
of the races, but it would not eliminate them. Racers would have
to stop filing petitions prior to reading the agency's rationale for its
order, but because section 2112(a) would still reward the first bona
fide filer, the race would proceed in a subtler fashion. The race
might thus more closely resemble a rally than a drag race.
The second infirmity suggests a third. The courts would in-
variably be called upon to decide what is, and is not, a race. Re-
solving whether a petitioner has raced might be more difficult than
deciding whether he or she has won, because it inevitably invites a
probe into the alleged racer's motives. Thus, while penalizing
racers might enhance the decorum of the race and save clients the
expense of the sprint, it would not reduce the agency, client and
court resources needed to find the proper resting place for a case,
and it might even increase those costs.
Finally, penalizing racers would only act as a disincentive if
penalties were uniformly and consistently applied. If one court
consistently declined to transfer, forum shoppers could still race to
that circuit. The courts have in the past been unwilling to penalize
racers, and there is little chance that they will begin to do so absent
a statutory mandate. Hence, the necessary consistency will prob-
ably not evolve without congressional action.
227 A similar argument could be made if a court were to rely upon its common
law inherent power to transfer, see text accompanying note 151 supra, instead of
§ 2112(a)'s discretionary transfer provision. Such judicial action which rendered
a constitutionally valid congressional statute a nullity would probably exceed the
bounds of judicial discretion.
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b. Uniform Judicial Adherence to the Doctrine of Controlling
Decision
The courts could eliminate much forum shopping by eliminat-
ing the perception in lawyers' minds that it pays to shop. Profes-
sor Vestal has recently suggested that forum shopping and many
other evils could be reduced or eliminated if the courts of appeals
would return to their previous adherence to the "doctrine of con-
trolling decision." 228 That doctrine holds that "as a matter of
judicial comity a court should follow a decision of a court of coor-
dinate jurisdiction on a question of law." 229 If the courts of
appeals strictly adhered to this doctrine, an unfavorable legal prece-
dent in one circuit would theoretically create no incentive to avoid
that circuit in future cases, because the court that heard the second
case would be bound by the first decision.
Assuming that the courts of appeals agreed in principle to
abide by the doctrine of controlling decision, their action would
probably have very little impact on forum shopping. The doctrine
on its face applies only to questions of law. It would therefore en-
compass only appeals based upon the agency's statutory construction
and perhaps upon the validity of the agency's procedural choices;
it would have no impact at all on forum shopping for review of
the record support for an agency's decision. A more serious objec-
tion is that the proposal addresses only such forum shopping as
occurs after one court has rendered a decision on a legal question.
Rather than discouraging forum shopping, the proposal might en-
courage the parties to pursue even more vigorously forum shopping
for the circuit to decide the first case, because the stakes would be
much higher. The controlling decision doctrine, if thoroughly
implemented, would also eliminate forum shopping's "percolation"
and signaling advantages.
The courts of appeals have shown no great respect for the doc-
trine of controlling decision in recent years. Professor Vestal's
painstaking and comprehensive analysis of that doctrine in the
eleven circuits is elegant testimony to the refusal of today's
228 See Vestal, supra note 44, at 165. Professor Vestal recommends that the
courts preclude federal agencies from relitigating legal issues that have already been
decided by one circuit court. As already discussed, see text accompanying note 62
supra, this solution would be inadequate for the large number of administrative
"polycentric" proceedings in which appeals may be filed by parties that are ag-
grieved but are in substantial agreement with the agency. This Article assumes,
therefore, that the doctrine of controlling decision would apply to all parties to an
administrative appeal.
229 Vestal, supra note 44, at 219.
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independent-minded appellate courts to adhere to it.230 Indeed,
even panels within individual circuits do not necessarily adhere to
the doctrine as applied to prior decisions of other panels in the
same circuit.2 31  Judicial performance therefore leads Professor
Vestal to the somewhat understated conclusion that "the doctrine
of controlling decision may not have the vitality it once had."
2 2
The courts of appeals are not likely to rally round that doctrine
in the near future. Even if the doctrine were somehow imposed
upon them through statute or Supreme Court decision, cases are
easily enough distinguished from one another that independent
panels could still avoid thorough application of the doctrine, and
forum shoppers would still race.
Perhaps sensing judicial reluctance to implement the doctrine
of controlling decision, another commentator has suggested statu-
tory imposition of stare decisis upon the courts of appeals as a
mechanism for securing national uniformity.2 33 Under this pro-
posal an en banc holding by one circuit on a question of law would
be binding upon all panels of all other circuits. 234 A subsequent
court of appeals, sitting en banc, could write an opinion stating
its objections to the former circuit's reasoning, but it could not
reverse that circuit.2 35 The dissenting opinion would act as a
signal to the Supreme Court that the two circuits disagreed, and it
could provide some degree of percolation.
Except for adding the percolation and signaling functions,
however, this proposal retains all of the disadvantages of the con-
trolling decision doctrine. It only discourages forum shopping for
forum avoidance; the forum for the first decision becomes even
more important. Parties could still forum shop for review of the
record support of agency action. Finally, a court of appeals that
desired to avoid the statutory rule could do so easily enough by
distinguishing undistinguishable cases.
c. More Frequent Supreme Court Review of Intercircuit Conflicts
It has been suggested that much of the added burden on the
courts of appeals that is due to intercircuit forum shopping is at-
tributable to the Supreme Court's failure to review administrative
230 Id. 140-60.
231 See id. 161; Wasby, supra note 44.
232 Vestal, supra note 44, at 166.
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action with sufficient regularity.2 6 If litigants were assured of a
high probability that their appeals would ultimately be heard in
the Supreme Court, then the incentive to shop among the inter-
mediate courts might be reduced. The Supreme Court might
therefore be urged to exercise greater supervision over the lower
courts to eliminate the divergencies in approach that breed forum
shopping.
The premise of this proposal, however, is open to challenge.
It is not universally true that the Court has been slow to review
administrative appeals. Supreme Court review of legal questions
in the environmental and occupational health and safety fields,
for example, has been reasonably frequent.237 Indeed, the Court's
good record in reviewing intercircuit conflicts provides the parties
with an incentive to forum shop to avoid a prior precedent, as is
evidenced by the recent spate of forum avoidance attempts in those
fields. Unless the Supreme Court dramatically increased the num-
ber of administrative appeals that it reviewed at the expense of
other appeals involving important national issues, the possibility of
Supreme Court review would have little effect on such forum shop-
ping as is based on the general reputations of the circuits.
d. Simultaneous Filings
Although broad-scale attempts at judicial solutions to the forum
shopping problem are probably not warranted, the courts can ad-
dress the thorny problem of simultaneous filings that is beginning to
imperil the workability of the first-to-file rule.238 The courts could
attempt to remedy the problem of simultaneous filings in a variety
of ways. They could, for example, establish an ad hoc panel of
judges from the circuits in which petitions have been filed to pass
upon the discretionary transfer question. This solution, however,
would merely establish a second threshold level of argument that
would seem to be particularly wasteful.
A better solution would be for the courts, through the Judicial
Conference, to adopt an automatic mechanism, such as a lottery,
236 Id. 1223. See also Hruska Commission Report, supra note 41, at 221-24,
298-99; Leventhal, supra note 19, at 888; Note, supra note 81, at 1223. But see
G. CASPER & R. PosNER, THE Wonu~oAD OF THE SuPRu~m_ CouNT 91 (1978).
23 7 See note 67 supra. The survey of agency general counsels conducted by
Professors Currie and Goodman for the Hruska Commission revealed very little dis-
satisfaction with the Supreme Court's record in resolving intercircuit conflicts. See
G. CASPER & R. PosNxa, supra note 236, at 91; Hruska Commission Report, supra
note 41, at 376-90.
2 38 See notes 205-10 supra & accompanying text.
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for deciding which court will make the threshold determination.
In cases in which two or more petitions are filed within less than a
specified fraction of a minute of one another,23 9 the clerks of all
courts in which petitions were filed would be required to telephone
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and apprise
it of that fact. The Administrative Office could then choose the
circuit to hear the threshold arguments by lot. Although there is
no explicit statutory authority for this proposed solution to the
simultaneous filings impasse, an arguable case can be made that the
courts have authority to adopt such a mechanism under their gen-
eral housekeeping statute.240  Still, to the extent that this judicially
imposed solution is inconsistent with the first-to-file rule of section
2112 (a), its validity is in doubt.241 Ultimately, Congress has the
responsibility to repair section 2112(a)'s failed mechanism.
2. Agency Patch and Repair
Reacting to an anticipated flood of future courthouse races,
242
the agencies have already begun to patch the crumbling section
2112(a) edifice. 243  Two agencies have recently promulgated race-to-
the-courthouse regulations that directly address the problems raised
by such races, and the courts have so far viewed the regulations
favorably.244 These regulations are designed to ensure that the
race is run fairly and that all parties know the precise moment at
which the race begins. By setting the time for the race sufficiently
far in advance these regulations also eliminate the spectacle and
expense of past races. Attorneys may with the utmost decorum
study the agency's regulation, write reasonably comprehensive peti-
tions for review, and file those petitions in the forum of choice at
precisely the moment that the race begins. These recent regulations
239 The specified fraction should depend on the accuracy of courthouse clocks.
Fifteen seconds is probably a good estimate of the ability of courthouse clocks to
record simultaneous events.
240 Congress has given the federal courts the general authority to "from time
to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business." 28 U.S.C. § 2071
(1976). See generally 4 WmrHT & MmTER, supra note 4, at § 1001; Weinstein,
Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUm. L. REv. 905 (1976).
241The federal housekeeping statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976), explicitly ex-
empts from its delegation of rulemaking authority exercises of that authority that
would be inconsistent with acts of Congress.
242 See judicial Review Under Clean Water Act; Races to the Courthouse, Pro-
posed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,006, 32,007 (1979).
243 Agency efforts to address courthouse races have received the encouragement
of the courts. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (opinion of Leventhal, J.).
244 See note 17 supra.
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are exemplary attempts to remedy past deficiencies and, in the
absence of further legislation, other agencies should be encouraged
to adopt similar race-to-the-courthouse regulations.
The agencies can, however, do even more to alleviate problems
that have arisen under section 2112(a). The agencies could signifi-
cantly aid the courts in resolving questions concerning the scope of
agency orders 245 and the status of successive orders 246 by addressing
these questions prior to appeal. For example, when an agency
simultaneously issues what looks like several orders at the end of a
single proceeding, as in Bristol Laboratories, Inc. v. Richardson,
2 47
the agency could simply state at the outset that it considered all of
the orders the "same order" for purposes of section 2112(a). Simi-
larly, when an agency in a continuing proceeding issues a successive
order before the appeal of a prior order from the same proceeding
has been decided, the agency could at the time it issues the second
order state its determination that they are both the "same order."
One serious objection to this proposal is that critics could
charge the agency with attempting to usurp the courts' power to
interpret section 2112(a). An initial agency assessment, however,
would not purport to bind the reviewing courts; it would merely
be an attempt to aid the courts in resolving a difficult threshold
question. The courts would presumably give some deference to
those initial agency determinations, because the agencies are familiar
with their own statutes and their unique procedural peculiarities.
In upholding the CPSC and EPA race-to-the-courthouse require-
ments, both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits stressed that "[a]gencies
have a great deal of discretion in determining the manner in which
their actions are promulgated." 246 The courts should show similar
deference to agency attempts to define the scope of their orders.
Another objection to this proposal is that, in the case of suc-
cessive orders, agencies may use their power to determine the scope
of facially separate orders as a means of forum shopping in dero-
gation of the clear intent of section 2112(a) that they not be allowed
to do so. If the agency were pleased with the circuit reviewing the
first order, it could mark successive orders the "same order" as the
first so that they too would be reviewed by that circuit. If, how-
ever, the agency were unhappy with the forum for review, it could
call successive actions separate orders in the hopes that a non-adverse
245 See notes 129-36 supra & accompanying text.
246See notes 137-49 supra & accompanying text.
247 456 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1971).
248 Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. EPA, 610 F.2d 187, 188 (4th Cir. 1979)
(quoting Southland Mower Co. v. CPSC, 600 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1979)).
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party will this time win any ensuing race. The incentive to forum
shop in this manner, however, is not very strong. The agency
would know which court was deciding the first appeal, but it would
not know how that court decided.2 49 There may be a temptation
here for the agency to take that court's general reputation into
account in making its "same order" determination, but it should
not be very strong in light of the convenience to the agency itself
of arguing both appeals at the same time in the same place. More-
over, the agency should have some incentive to resist that temptation
in order to maintain consistency in making "same order" deter-
minations through time. Finally, judicial review of the "same
order" determination, though deferential, should be capable of cur-
ing agency abuses. In sum, agency "same order" determinations
could substantially aid the threshold process in the few cases that
call for that determination without much risk of doing violence to
the intent of section 2112(a).
C. Statutory Reforms
Because agency and judicial patch and repair efforts are not
likely to remedy many of the problems that have arisen in the
section 2112(a) practice, statutory changes should be considered.
In considering statutory changes, however, one should bear in mind
that the current section 2112(a) practice, while nettlesome and pro-
fessionally embarrassing, is not a major social problem. Proposals
for statutory reform must reflect the modest nature of the problem
that they address.
Proposals for statutory reform could attempt either to eliminate
forum shopping entirely, or merely to manage it by eliminating
some of its more unseemly and wasteful aspects. It is difficult,
however, to envision a reasonably workable scheme for eliminating
forum shopping outright that does not simply designate a single
court of appeals to hear all administrative appeals of a certain type.
Even the most careful delineation of the kinds of cases for which a
particular court had exclusive venue would probably still breed
threshold litigation; moreover, this would generally require Con-
gress to choose sides in controversies over which court ought to
have exclusive venue. Proposals for managing or controlling forum
shopping are probably more politically palatable, but they leave
249 If the appeal of the first order has been decided, then the first and second
orders can not as a matter of judicial flat be considered the "same order." See
notes 145-49 supra & accompanying text.
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the underlying problem unresolved and therefore require constant
vigilance to guard against predictable efforts to avoid the control
mechanisms.
The following section of this Article examines and evaluates
several proposals for eliminating or controlling forum shopping. It
concludes that no acceptable mechanism for eliminating forum
shopping is presently available. Of the control mechanisms an
automatic mechanism seems preferable to proposed discretionary
mechanisms.
1. Mechanisms for Eliminating Forum Shopping
a. Exclusive Venue in a Particular Court
Perhaps the most effective way to eliminate forum shopping
is to limit the available forums to a single court. This could be
accomplished either by designating one of the existing courts of
appeals as the exclusive forum for some or all administrative ap-
peals or by creating a new "administrative court." 20 Designating
a single court to hear all appeals of a particular variety eliminates
the cost and embarrassment of the race to the courthouse and much
of the cost of litigating threshold matters. By allowing simultane-
ously pending cases involving the same or very similar legal and
factual questions to be consolidated for argument before the same
panel of that court, the proposal could even further increase ju-
dicial economy. Because only one court would have jurisdiction
to hear particular appeals, there would likewise be no threat to
judicial comity. Moreover, to the extent that panels within the
single court would maintain consistency, this solution should re-
duce business uncertainty 21 and encourage uniform application
of national policy.252 Exclusive venue in a particular circuit is
especially appropriate for programs for which Congress has imposed
deadlines upon the agency and the regulated industry, because the
uncertainty and delay attributable to conflicting court decisions that
2 50 This is by no means the first attempt to analyze the arguments for and
against designating an exclusive forum for judicial review of administrative action.
The author has relied heavily on the following sources: P. CABBINCToN, D. MEADOR,
& M. ROSENBERG, JUST.CE ON APP AL (1976) [hereinafter cited as JUsTIcE ON
APPEAL]; COMMsISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL CoURT APPELLATE SYsTEM,
HEARINGS SECOND PHASE 1974-1975, at 357 (1974) (testimony of A. Scalia) [here-
inafter cited as CoMMIssIm ON REViSION]; GENERAL VMV, supra note 81; Car-
rington, supra note 74; Currie & Goodman, supra note 3; Leventhal, supra note
19; Nathanson, The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L. REv. 996 (1971).
251 See Leventhal, supra note 19, at 884.
252 See GENERALu VIEw, supra note 81, at 186; Currie & Goodman, supra note
3, at 63; Nathanson, supra note 250, at 1010; Vestal, supra note 44, at 176.
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result from forum shopping can frustrate such deadlines. An added
advantage of exclusive review, unrelated to its effects on forum
shopping, is the possibility that it would relieve the rest of the
courts of appeals from some of their burdensome caseloads.253
On the other hand, vesting exclusive jurisdiction in a single
court would completely deny the Supreme Court the percolating
and signaling advantages of multi-circuit review.m 4  To the lim-
ited extent that convenience to the parties is a realistic concern,25
exclusive jurisdiction in a single court could cause inconvenience
to some parties.256 Moreover, while vesting exclusive jurisdiction
may take pressure off some courts, it will of course add to the pres-
sure of the courts receiving exclusive jurisdiction.27 Even if a
new "administrative court" is created to hear all administrative
appeals, its caseload could easily match the current caseload of the
District of Columbia Circuit. s8  Still another danger of vesting
exclusive review in a single court is the possibility that over time
the relationship between the two institutions would either blossom
2 5 3 See Co-assioN ON REvIsION, supra note 250, at 359; GENERA. Vrsw,
supra note 81, at 184; Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 64; Nathanson, supra
note 250, at 996. There is, however, some debate as to just how much this would
free up the appellate courts. Clearly, designating particular courts of appeals as
exclusive courts to hear particular administrative appeals would reduce the load on
the courts as a whole only to the extent that forum shopping presently accounts
for additional cases. Even if an entirely new "administrative court" were created,
the net reduction in the workload of the courts of appeals would apparently be of
little significance. See COImassioN ON REvwsroN, supra note 250, at 359 (estimat-
ing nine percent reduction in federal appellate caseload); Currie & Goodman,
supra note 3, at 64; Nathanson, supra note 250, at 997. Assuming that 1,400
cases of nationwide scope or effect in 1979 might have been shifted into an "admin-
isrative court," see text accompanying notes 265-67 infra, the administrative court
in 1979 would only reduce the total workload of the appellate courts by approxi-
mately seven percent of its current 20,219 petitions. ADmrNrsRArrE OFFICE
OF Tm UNITED STATES CouniTs, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF TiE DmEcToR 44,
table 2 [hereinafter cited as AO REPORT]. Indeed, even shifting all of the 2,922
appeals from administrative agencies would only reduce the workload by 14 percent.
2Z4 See Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 69; Note, Forum Shopping in
Appellate Review of FTC Cease and Desist Orders, 13 UTAH L. REv. 316, 338
(1968).
25 5 See text accompanying notes 156-58 supra.
25 6 See Carrington, supra note 74, at 605; Currie & Goodman, supra note 3,
at 74; Note, supra note 254, at 337.
257 See JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 250, at 171; Carrington, supra note
74, at 605; Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 64.
258 In fiscal 1979, 1,415 petitions were filed in the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit. AO REPORT, supra note 253, at 44, table 2. An estimated 1,000 to 1,400
cases would be heard by a court hearing only appeals from agency actions having
nationwide scope of effect. See text accompanying notes 265-67 infra. If the
"administrative court" heard all 2,922 agency appeals, AO REPORT, supra note 253,
at 49, table 6, its caseload would be exceeded only by that of the Fifth Circuit.
AO REPORT, supra note 253, at 44, table 2. (The Ninth Circuit had 3,010 filings,
but 471 of those were agency appeals, which would have gone to the "administra-
tive court.").
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or sour to such an extent that the court would be either too hesitant
or too eager to reverse agency decisions. 259  In either case, the
nature of judicial review of administrative action might change if
a substantial number of administrative appeals were heard in a
single circuit. Moreover, vesting exclusive venue in a single court
for preenforcement review of major regulations would leave unan-
swered the question whether district courts and other appellate
courts could reconsider the validity of the regulation at the en-
forcement stage. If the validity of regulations is open for review at
the enforcement stage, the potential still exists for conflicting deci-
sions despite the attempt to achieve uniformity through exclusive
venue.
260
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of vesting a single court with
exclusive jurisdiction over some or all administrative appeals is the
difficulty of defining that court's jurisdiction accurately enough to
preclude wasteful threshold litigation over jurisdictional matters.261
At one extreme Congress could amend the venue provisions of
every statute that currently provides for court of appeals review of
administrative action to specify a particular circuit for each agency
action. While this approach should eliminate any threshold ju-
risdictional litigation, it would be extraordinarily cumbersome, and
would undoubtedly touch off numerous congressional disputes over
which courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over which appeals.
Congress could, alternatively, draft a statute that would provide
for exclusive venue in a single court for all administrative appeals
over which federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction. This ap-
proach, however, would burden a single court with hundreds of
appeals, such as from NLRB unfair labor practice findings, that
have minimal, if any, national significance, and could force local
litigants to argue their appeals in distant forums.
259 Compare Fels, supra note 85, at 46 and Nathanson, supra note 250, at
1012-14 with Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 71.
260 Congress could attempt to resolve the problem of review at the enforcement
stage in one of two ways. First, Congress could simply prohibit such review, as it
has done in the Clean Air Act, which precludes review in enforcement proceed-
ings of actions with respect to which pre-enforcement review could have been
obtained. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(b) (2) (Supp. 1980). This solution, however,
might be viewed as unfair by regulatees who do not regularly read the Federal
Register. Second, Congress could ensure uniformity by mandating that enforcement
actions take place only in the circuit in which the pre-enforcement appeal was
heard. This solution seems awkward at best and very inconvenient at worst; it
makes little sense to require an agency to try in the District of Columbia Circuit an
enforcement case involving conduct occurring in California simply because the regu-
lation under which the enforcement action arises survived judicial review in the
District of Columbia Circuit.
261 See JusTIcE ON APPEA_, supra note 250, at 170; COMMISSION ON REvisioN,
supra note 250, at 360; Currie & Goodman, supra note 3, at 73-74.
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A compromise might be a statute that would vest exclusive
venue for all appeals from administrative actions having "national
significance" in a single court. Such a statute would reflect the
policy judgment that here the percolation and signaling advan-
tages of forum shopping must take a back seat to the need for
national uniformity and business certainty. Congress has in fact
attempted this approach in its most recent amendments to the
Clean Air Act, which provide for exclusive review of actions that
the Administrator finds to be of "nationwide scope or effect" by
the District of Columbia Circuit.262 Unfortunately, terms like
"national significance" and "nationwide scope or effect" still beg
for wasteful threshold jurisdictional litigation.26 3 Congress could
perhaps discourage some threshold litigation by providing, as it
apparently did in the Clean Air Act, for the agency to make an
unreviewable determination of "national significance." Private
litigants, however, might oppose placing the threshold determina-
tion in the agency's hands on the ground that it would allow the
agency to forum shop for review by the District of Columbia Circuit.
Despite the disadvantages of this compromise solution, it re-
mains an attractive possibility. Congress has on many occasions
vested exclusive review of administrative action in particular
courts 2 without an inordinant amount of threshold jurisdictional
litigation. If only agency actions having nationwide scope or effect
were reviewable in a single court the burden may not be as great
as some commentators fear. Of 2,922 petitions for review of ad-
ministrative agency proceedings filed in the federal appellate courts
in fiscal 1979, over forty percent were petitions from NLRB and
IRS actions, six percent were from the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, and another five percent arose out of the occupational
safety and health field.265 Practically none of these appeals involved
an issue of nationwide scope or effect. 266 Hence, easily fifty percent
262 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(b) (1) (Supp. 1980).
263 Professor Currie suggests the case in which a national standard for gold
mines has practical application only in three of the 11 circuits. Currie, supra note
6, at 1267. Such a standard would not have nationwide effect, but it would have
nationwide scope, and would therefore seem to be reviewable only in the District
of Columbia Circuit. This result, however, is certainly open to question.
264 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4915(a) (1976) (exclusive review in District of
Columbia Circuit of Noise Act standards); 42 U.S.C.A. §7607(b)(1) (Supp.
1980) (exclusive review in District of Columbia Circuit of certain Clean Air Act
standards); 47 U.S.C. §402(b) (1976) (exclusive review in District of Columbia
Circuit of FCC license denials).
265 AO REPORT, supra note 253, at 49, table 6.
266 Virtually all NLRB, IRS and INS appeals involve agency actions directed
at individual employers, unions, taxpayers or aliens. Although some occupational
safety and health appeals involve national regulations promulgated by OSHA, see
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of the petitions for administrative review filed last year did not
involve actions having nationwide significance. Yet as many as
1,400 and probably more than 1,000 cases potentially did meet that
test. The District of Columbia Circuit, the busiest circuit for ad-
ministrative review, had only 666 administrative review petitions
in 1979.267 Vesting that court with exclusive jurisdiction over ap-
peals from agency actions of nationwide scope and effect could po-
tentially double its administrative appeals caseload. On the other
hand, if an entirely separate "administrative court" were created,
its caseload of as high as 1,400 cases would be less than the total
caseloads of seven of the eleven circuits.2 8  Nevertheless, because
administrative appeals of national significance are generally more
technical and time consuming than other appeals, many of which
can be disposed of summarily, an administrative caseload of 1,000-
1,400 cases could be extraordinarily burdensome.
b. Exclusive Venue in the Courts of the "Affected Regions"
Congress could effectively reduce, though not eliminate, forum
shopping by requiring transfer to a court of appeals according to a
single criterion. A recently introduced bill, for example, would
amend section 2112(a) to require the court in which the first petition
was filed to determine whether a "substantial portion of the impact
or injury" of the administrative action was in one or more judicial
circuits; if so the court would be required to transfer to one of
those circuits.26
9
Advantages accruing from such a proposal, however, are more
apparent than real. Convenience of the parties, 270 to the extent
that it is a substantial concern, 271 would be furthered only if at
29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976), the bulk of the appeals are from the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission, which adjudicates civil penalty actions
directed at individual violations of OSHA standards or of the Act's general duty
clause. See 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1976). This is not to say, of course, that individual
determinations may not have precedential significance or nationwide scope and
effect.
267 AO RE oRT, supra note 253, at 49.
268 Id. 44.
269 S. 739, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1979). The Senate Judiciary Committee
has reported a similar bill that would amend § 2112(a) to list the regional impact
of the agency action as a transfer criterion along with the convenience of the
parties and the interest of justice. S. 2147, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 218(c) (1980).
See also H.R. 6782, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)
(1976)).
270 See 125 CONG. REc. S3188 (daily ed. March 22, 1979) (statement of Sen.
Laxalt) [hereinafter cited as Laxalt Statement]; id. S9126 (daily ed. July 10, 1979)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) [hereinafter cited as DeConcini Statement].
271 See notes 153-58 supra & accompanying text.
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least some of the parties were located in the chosen circuit.27 2  This
is not necessarily the case.273 The percolation and signaling
functions of multi-circuit review would not necessarily be pre-
served 274 because the proposal might just as easily result in all
appeals on a given issue being heard by a single circuit court of
appeals.
275
Not only do the advantages of the "affected region" approach
appear illusory, the scheme also has very authentic disadvantages.
First, because the current proposals would merely amend the dis-
cretionary transfer section of section 2112(a) to make transfer non-
discretionary, they would preserve the race to the forum that makes
the "affected region" determination. Litigants would probably view
one court as more liberal than another in transferring under this
test, and the race, with all its attendant costs, embarrassments, and
threats to judicial comity, would thus survive, though perhaps in a
somewhat attenuated form. This could be partially remedied by
simply limiting venue in the first instance to "affected regions," but
to the extent that the parties perceived differences between two
circuits that met the "affected regions" test there would still be
forum shopping attempts, and a mechanism would have to be de-
vised to deal with them.
Even assuming no races to the courthouse, the proposals would
guarantee that many client, government, and judicial resources
would be expended in virtually every contested case in deciding
whether "a substantial portion of the impact or injury" of the
administrative action would occur in one or more circuits.276 For
example, the proposal does not specify whose injury must be exam-
ined in deciding where the impact or injury occurs. While a sub-
stantial portion of the economic impact of a regulation limiting
272 Indeed, the proposed amendment to § 2112(a) as written would apparently
require transfer to a "substantially affected" circuit even if it did not have juris-
diction to hear the case. See Testimony of Assistant Attorney General James W.
Moorman before the Subcommittee on Judicial Improvements of the Senate Judiciary
Committee (Feb. 20, 1979), reprinted in Legal Times of Washington, Feb. 25,
1980, at 21, col. I [hereinafter cited as Moorman Testimony]. This defect, how-
ever, could be cured by providing only for transfer to a circuit in which a petition
had been filed and in which jurisdiction was proper.
273 See, e.g., Moorman Testimony, supra note 272, at 22; Marcus, Environ-
mentalists Lash Out at Bills Curbing D.C. Venue, Nat'l L.J., March 3, 1980, at 4,
col. 2 (quoting William A. Butler, General Counsel of the Environmental Defense
Fund).
2 7 4 See DeConcini Statement, supra note 270, at S9126.
275 For example, one can easily imagine the Tenth Circuit becoming, under
the "regional impact" test, the exclusive circuit for review of all agency actions
affecting the development of shale oil, because the vast bulk of shale oil reserves
are located in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming.
276 See Moorman Testimony, supra note 272.
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sulfur dioxide emissions from new copper smelters would probably
be in one or more of the western circuits, a substantial portion of
the environmental injury due to acid rain caused by copper smelters
could occur in one of the midwest or eastern circuits. Furthermore,
the proposal provides no mechanism for determining which of two
or more circuits that meet the test will hear the merits of the
appeal. Hence, even after a court makes the threshold "affected
region" determination, it may be required to make an additional,
essentially discretionary, choice between two or more qualifying
circuits. In sum, the "affected region" test would result in loosely
confined threshold litigation, "precisely the kind of litigation that
venue statutes are intended to avoid." 277
2. Managing Forum Shopping
Should Congress determine that the available mechanisms for
reducing or eliminating forum shopping for review of administra-
tive action are not feasible, it might still attempt to reduce or
eliminate some of the more wasteful and unseemly aspects of the
current practice under section 2112(a). At least two models for
managing forum shopping are available. Congress could vest a
single body with authority to decide, according to specified criteria,
which of the available courts of appeals should decide the merits of
the controversy. Alternatively, Congress could eliminate the need
for any intermediate decisionmaker by specifying an automatic
mechanism, such as a lottery or a nonperiodic rotation, for deter-
mining which of the available courts will hear the merits of an
appeal.
a. Discretionary Mechanisms: The Multi-district Panel Proposal
Should Congress opt for a discretionary mechanism, it might
adopt a recent proposal to lodge the threshold decision in a special
panel such as the judicial panel on multi-district litigation.278 The
2 7 7 Currie, supra note 6, at 1266.
Current proposals for vesting venue exclusively in circuits in which a substantial
portion of the impact or injury occur are apparently designed solely to avoid the
District of Columbia Circuit. See Laxalt Statement, supra note 270, at S3188
("[Tihe precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit more precisely reflects the
attitudes of the Federal Government"); Statement of former Utah Governor Calvin
L. Rampton, quoted in Marcus, supra note 273, at A4, col. 2 ("It is difficult for a
judge whose entire experience has been in water-abundant areas of the nation
adequately to set in proper perspective the evidence and law if he has no exposure
to the ... water-short areas of our nation.").
278 See Ross & Goldman, supra note 42, at 27, col. 1; Haworth, Modest Pro-
posals to Smooth the Track for the Race to the Courthouse, 48 GEO. WA sS. L. R v.
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judicial panel on multi-district litigation presently consists of "seven
circuit and district judges designated from time to time by the
Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from
the same circuit." 279 The business of that panel is to transfer civil
actions "involving one or more common questions of fact" 280 that
have been filed in two or more district courts to a single court for
the conduct of pretrial proceedings. Congress established the panel
to increase judicial efficiency in supervising pretrial activities, to
eliminate the potential for conflicting district court pretrial rulings,
and to reduce inconvenience to parties and witnesses.281  Although
these do not precisely coincide with the purposes of section 2112(a),
the multi-district panel plays a role that is similar to that of a circuit
court deciding the discretionary transfer question under that section.
Congress might, therefore, simply eliminate the first-to-file rule and
instead require that all petitions that have been filed in more than
one court during the statutory filing period be transferred initially
to the panel on multi-district litigation for retransfer according to
specified criteria.2
2
This relatively simple mechanism would eliminate the race to
the courthouse with its attendant expense, potential for unfairness,
and embarrassment, because there would be no advantage in being
the first to file. The proposal also provides a convenient solution
to the "same order" problem, because the pendency of the same or
211 (1980); Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Proposal for Improvements in the Federal Appellate Courts, Proposal 7,
at 2 (June 21, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Justice Department Proposal]; Letter
from Win. Warfield Ross to Richard K. Berg, Executive Secretary, Administrative
Conference of the United States (Jan. 10, 1980) (on file at U. PA. L. REv.) [here-
inafter cited as Ross Letter]. Ross and Goldman make two alternative proposals
for ending the race to the courthouse [hereinafter referred to as "Ross Proposal 1"
and "Ross Proposal 2"]. Ross Proposal 1, relevant here, would have the panel on
multi-district litigation determine which circuit should hear the merits based on a
consideration of the following factors:
(i) the interest of the party most aggrieved by the agency order, (ii) the
pendency of related proceedings, (iii) the local nature of the subject
matter of the agency order, and (iv) the interest of the public at large;
or where none of the foregoing are relevant, by (i) the facilitation of
judicial administration and (ii) such other considerations as may be
relevant.
Id. 3-4.
Ross Proposal 2 would have the agency choose the forum on the basis of the
same considerations.
27928 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1976).
2801d. § 1407(a).
281 See Comment, The Experience of Transferee Courts under the Multidistrict
Litigation Act, 39 U. Cux. L. REy. 588, 590-91 (1972). In actual practice the
transfer has often resulted in the case coming to its conclusion in the transferee
court. Id. 607-09.
282 See Ross Proposal 1, supra note 278.
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interrelated proceedings in one circuit could be one of the criteria
for transfer. Finally, if Congress were willing to give the multi-
district panel the authority to issue stays pending resolution of the
threshold question, this proposal could also solve the problem of
temporary stays.2
83
The proposal, on the other hand, does not necessarily secure
uniform application of national policy and reduce business uncer-
tainty, because it would still allow forum shopping. The proposal
would only eliminate the initial race; the parties would still have
the opportunity, and in fact the obligation, to press for discretionary
transfer. Unless one of the criteria for transfer is the potential of
the transferee court to ensure uniformity, a criterion that is not
listed in any of the current proposals,284 the panel approach would
not be expected to further the uniformity and business certainty
policies. By the same token, the proposal has the corresponding
advantage of preserving the percolation and signaling advantages of
multi-circuit review.
The greatest disadvantage of the independent panel approach
to deciding the threshold question is its potential to consume large
amounts of client and judicial resources. While the proposal would
eliminate the expense of the race, it would probably increase the
cost of discretionary transfer litigation. In many cases under section
2112(a) the parties do not press for discretionary transfer once the
outcome of the race has been determined. The panel proposal,
however, would guarantee threshold litigation in every case in which
two petitions are filed in different circuits. Moreover, the criteria
for transfer, 285 while similar to those articulated by the courts in
section 2112(a) litigation,2 6 are extremely malleable and hence sub-
ject to intense dispute on a case-by-case basis.28 Even though only
a single panel would decide such cases, it is unlikely that a well-
settled "law of discretionary transfer" would ever evolve. Further-
more, some of the suggested criteria, such as the relative aggrieve-
ment of the parties and the local nature of the subject matter, would
2 8 3 See notes 201-04 supra & accompanying text.
284 Ross Proposal 1 lists "the interest of the public at large" as a criterion.
Conceivably the interest of the public at large would be furthered by the uniform
application of national policy. One could more directly ensure consideration of this
policy by listing as a criterion "the potential of the transferee court to ensure
uniformity." See note 278 supra.
285 See note 284 supra.
286 See notes 150-200 supra & accompanying text.
287 In fact, enterprising attorneys are sure to turn these transfer criteria into a
charade by disingenuously arguing that justice or convenience requires transfer
when their sole motivation for so arguing is the desire to have the merits heard in
a friendlier forum. See note 42 supra.
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occasionally call for factual inquiries or at the very least for time-
consuming scrutiny of the administrative record. Finally, the com-
bination of the amount and intensity of the litigation that could be
expected to result from the proposal's adoption would virtually guar-
antee that the panel could not expeditiously dispose of the transfer
cases. Briefing, arguing, and deciding such cases could consume
months. In addition to the direct costs of the proceedings, the
delay itself could in many cases cause great loss to one or more of
the parties.
2 8
b. Discretionary Mechanisms: Transfer Criteria
In spite of these flaws, Congress could still choose a discre-
tionary transfer mechanism as a partial solution to the forum shop-
ping problem. The success or failure of such a mechanism might
depend upon the effectiveness and fairness of the criteria chosen
to guide the multi-district panel in making the transfer determina-
tion. It is therefore necessary to examine several recently proposed
criteria, most of which have already been suggested by the courts
in deciding cases under section 2112(a).
(i) Judicial Expertise
The recent proposal that the "application of judicial expertise"
be a criterion for ordering discretionary transfer 289 is as novel as
it is intriguing. The courts have consistently refused to adopt the
concept of "specialization of tribunals." 290 Yet adopting "judicial
expertise" as a criterion for transfer would inevitably lead the
courts in the direction of specialization. After a court had decided
one or two cases under a particular regulatory scheme, it could ex-
pect, other things being equal and venue being proper, to receive
subsequent cases under the same regulatory scheme.
Applying "judicial expertise" as a transfer criterion could have
several advantages. Allowing the judges that have familiarized
themselves with a regulatory scheme to continue to hear cases aris-
ing out of that scheme could increase judicial efficiency. Under
288 See Fels, supra note 85, at 49. The identity of the party harmed by the
litigation delay would depend upon whether or not the agency or the multi-district
panel stayed the effectiveness of the agency action. In either case delay could have
a financial or physical impact on at least one of the parties.
289 See Justice Department Proposal, supra note 278, at 3; Note, Venue for
Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: A New Approach, 93 HAnv. L. REv.
1735 (1980).
2 90 See note 174 supra.
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present court of appeals assignment policies, however, this pur-
ported advantage of "judicial expertise" transfer is illusory, because
there is no guarantee that the same panel in the transferee circuit
would hear all appeals arising out of a single statutory scheme or
even out of a single administrative proceeding. 91 Obviously it
would take a large number of cases to ensure that all of the judges
in a circuit acquired expertise in the ins and outs of a regulatory
scheme. A given panel could probably learn as much from the
experience of a panel in another circuit as it could learn from the
experience of a panel in its own circuit. Apart from its experi-
ence in deciding cases under a statutory scheme, there is no reason
to suppose that one court of appeals is likely to have more "judicial
expertise" than another. There is little indication that any judge
is chosen for a particular circuit because his or her background in-
dicates an expertise that might be useful in that circuit. Hence,
the whole concept of "judicial expertise" lacks any practical mean-
ing in a system in which courts are composed of many generalist
judges, any three of whom may hear a given case on a given day.
If "judicial expertise" were nevertheless adopted as a criterion
the multi-district panel could ignore the above objections and sim-
ply impose specialization by brute force. All FCC and EPA cases
might be sent to the District of Columbia Circuit because that
circuit already is required by statute to hear many cases arising from
those agencies. 292 All SEC cases could be sent to the Second Cir-
cuit, because that circuit includes Wall Street. Department of In-
terior and Park Service cases could be routed to the Tenth Circuit,
energy cases to the Fifth Circuit and so on. After a sufficient
number of transfers the courts might indeed become expert tri-
bunals. But this is not guaranteed, because there is no assurance
that venue will always, or even usually, be proper in the "expert"
circuit.293 Additionally, to the extent that the "judicial expertise"
criterion, where applicable, did not always prevail over the other
discretionary criteria, still further transfers could go to "non-
expert" circuits.
Assuming that expert courts would nevertheless evolve, it is
certainly debatable whether the advantages of the resulting system
would outweigh its disadvantages. The "expert" courts could po-
tentially acquire the same narrowness of view and biased perspective
that argues against the proposal for vesting exclusive venue in a
291 This point has been largely ignored by the critics of agency relitigation.
292 See note 264 supra.
293 Venue is generally determined by reference to the particular agency statute.
See note 40 supra.
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single court.2 94 In any event, that balance is probably best struck
by Congress in individual venue statutes and not by a multi-district
panel applying a "judicial expertise" criterion.
(ii) Pendency of Same or Similar Proceeding
If the first of two successive orders is currently pending in one
court of appeals at the time the multi-district panel is required to
decide where to lodge the subsequent order, the panel obviously
should take that factor into consideration. Indeed, under the "same
or interrelated proceedings" test for the definition of the "same
order," 295 this should be the only criterion applied. To advance
judicial economy and to eliminate the threat of inconsistent rulings
on the "same order," the multi-district panel should follow the cur-
rent practice of the circuit courts 296 and transfer the proceeding
to the court in which an appeal concerning the "same order" is
currently pending. The cases would then presumably be consoli-
dated for a single decision by a single panel. In addition, the
previous suggestion that the agencies adopt the practice of specifying
whether simultaneous or successive orders are the "same order" is
equally applicable here.2
97
The considerations, however, are different when the first court
has already decided a case involving similar issues or when a peti-
tion that does not involve the "same order" is currently pending
before another court. In neither of these cases would consolidation
necessarily preserve judicial economy. As previously discussed,29 8
there is no guarantee that the same panel in the transferee circuit
would hear both cases. Moreover, especially when a prior decision
has already been rendered, failure to transfer poses no threat to
judicial comity, because by definition the proceedings do not involve
the same agency action. The second court might reject the first
court's reasoning, but it theoretically would not be directly con-
tradicting the mandate of the prior circuit.
(iii) Comparative Aggrievement
The courts of appeals in two cases have ordered discretionary
transfer on the ground that the first petitioner was not sufficiently
294 See text accompanying note 259 supra.
295See notes 137-49 supra & accompanying text. There appears to be no good
reason why the "same or interrelated proceedings" test would not prove as service-
able to the muti-district panel as it has been to the courts of appeals.
296 See text accompanying notes 137-44 supra.
297 See text accompanying notes 245-49 supra.
298 See text accompanying notes 145-49 supra.
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"aggrieved" by the agency's action.299 However, the courts have on
many occasions stated that this ground should only be used where
the "inconsequential" character of the petitioner's aggrievement is
clear from the petitioner's own stipulation, pleading or representa-
tion. 00 Despite the courts' past reluctance to rely upon this cri-
terion, "the interest of the party most aggrieved" has been suggested
as a criterion for use by the multi-district panel in deciding upon
the appropriate transferee court.
801
Listing "comparative aggrievement" as a transfer criterion
would discourage some forum shopping by parties who were sub-
stantial winners at the agency level. It would likewise implement
the policy currently underlying section 2112(a) of preventing the
agency from choosing the forum. If "comparative aggrievement"'
were a criterion, a party would have no incentive to intervene in
the administrative proceeding on the side of the agency staff solely
for the purpose of choosing a review forum that was believed to be
sympathetic to the agency's position. Judicial insistence that a
petitioner have standing does not really remedy the problem of
frivolous forum shopping petitions, because the standing deter-
mination is usually made after the court has accepted jurisdiction
and has begun deciding the merits of the controversy. Because the
court will generally not dismiss the case on the ground that one
party lacks standing so long as its opponent is aggrieved by the
agency decision, the unaggrieved petitioner can as a practical matter
pick the forum in the absence of a mechanism that weeds out frivo-
lous petitions at the outset.
While it may make sense to penalize an unaggrieved petitioner
by denying it the forum of its choice, it makes much less sense to
advocate that the relative "aggrievements" of the various petitioners
be examined as a threshold matter. Such an examination would
require the body making the threshold determination to launch a
detailed and .probing inquiry into the merits of the controversy.
The experience of the court in Insurance Workers International
Union v. NLRB 802 should adequately demonstrate the extent to
which a court must explore the proceedings below in order to apply
this criterion, even in easy cases in which the petitioner's claim to
299 See note 163 supra.
800 See notes 167-68 supra & accompanying text.
301 See Ross Proposal 1, supra note 278. See also justice Department Proposal,
supra note 278, at 3.




have standing is very tenuous. Requiring the courts to ascertain
the party "most aggrieved" by the agency action, however, goes far
beyond even Insurance Workers. That court only decided that an
unaggrieved party should not have its choice of forum. The facts
did not require the court to examine the aggrievement of the other
petitioners. Making comparative aggrievement a criterion for dis-
cretionary transfer would require a threshold look at the alleged
aggrievement of all petitioners. It would also invariably require
value judgments as to the nature and extent of petitioners' harms.
In International Union Department v. Bingham,30 3 for example,
the petroleum industry petitioners alleged that their aggrievement
was far more substantial than that of the union. The petroleum
industry stood to lose half-a-billion dollars if OSHA's benzene
standard were upheld, whereas the union's complaint with the
standard was that it did not go far enough in protecting benzene
workers. Even though the union agreed with the agency action in
almost all particulars its position was that the agency's failure to
adopt the union's position in its entirety could result in the risk of
additional deaths among benzene workers, an "aggrievement" that,
if true, would appear to be substantial under any conceivable test.
The petroleum industry petitioners, of course, disagreed. But, as
Judge Leventhal recognized, a threshold hearing on discretionary
transfer is hardly the place for resolving these weighty contentions.
Congress could perhaps preclude extensive threshold inquiries
into aggrievement while at the same time preserving the multi-
district panel's discretion to refuse to honor requests for transfer by
frivolous petitioners by writing that requirement into the statute as
a strict "nonaggrievement" rule, rather than by listing comparative
aggrievement as a criterion. Congress could probably accomplish
this by providing that the multi-district panel refuse even to con-
sider petitions that were facially inadequate to establish aggrieve-
ment with the agency's decision. This would amount simply to a
statutory adoption of the rule that has already evolved in the appel-
late courts under section 2112(a). Even this relatively limited in-
quiry, however, will require a threshold scrutiny of the petitions,
the agency decision, and perhaps the agency record. It could like-
wise involve briefs and perhaps oral argument. Because inventive
counsel can usually find some substantial point on which to dis-
agree with an agency decision, this suggested nonaggrievement rule
would probably be successfully invoked only rarely. In the final
analysis its benefits may not justify its costs.
3o3 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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(iv) Regional Nature of the Problem
This Article has already examined proposals that cases be auto-
matically transferred to the circuit containing the "most affected
region." 304 Other proposals have stopped short of making "region-
ality" the only criterion for transfer, but have listed it as one of
several criteria.305 Although the advantages and disadvantages of
considering regionality as a threshold matter are attenuated when
it is only one of many criteria, the considerations are the same and
will not be recapitulated here, except to point out that consideration
of this criterion will involve still further time and expense for the
parties and the multi-district panel.
(v) Convenience of the Parties
As previously discussed, in most appeals from nationally ap-
plicable administrative action, the convenience of the parties is not
a relevant consideration. 306 Nevertheless, one can imagine cases,
such as between a large employer and a small union or a large union
and a small employer, in which convenience might play a role.
Listing "convenience of the parties" as a criterion would preserve
the multi-district panel's option to transfer in the relatively rare
cases in which the inconvenience to one of the parties outweighs
the other criteria.
(vi) Convenience of the Courts
The fact that lawyers sometimes consult the status of the
dockets of the courts where venue is proper indicates that the de-
sire for rapid resolution of a controversy can outweigh any perceived
advantage attributable to a court's reputation or general outlook.307
The need for expeditious resolution of cases is a relevant considera-
tion for the courts as well. Although no court has ever explicitly
relied upon the status of the docket of the potential transferee courts
as a reason for transfer,308 "sound judicial administration" has beln
304 See notes 269-77 supra & accompanying text
305 Justice Department Proposal, supra note 278, at 3; Ross Proposal 1, supra
note 278.
306 See notes 153-58 supra & accompanying text.
307 Two out of 18 relevant responses to the author's survey letter mentioned
this as a criterion of choice. See note 42 supra.
308The court in United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 697 (3d Cir.
1979), suggested "the relative state of the dockets" as a possible transfer criterion,




suggested as a possible criterion for transfer.30 9 The multi-district
panel would be in a good position to apply this criterion, because
it could objectively assess the respective backlogs of the relevant
courts. No searching inquiry of the administrative record would
be necessary.
The proposed criterion could, however, have the effect of
systematically routing most administrative cases in the direction of
some courts and away from others. For example, at the end of
fiscal 1979, seventy-five cases per judgeship were pending before the
Second Circuit, while 123, 116, 167, 148, and 176 cases per judge-
ship were pending in the District of Columbia, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, respectively.310 The same general dis-
parity holds for fiscal 1978. 811 Application of the "judicial admin-
istration" criterion alone in those years would presumably have
resulted in a net shift of administrative cases out of the District of
Columbia, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits and into the
Second Circuit, even though the Second Circuit received more fil-
ings per authorized judgeship than all but the Fourth Circuit in
1979 and all but the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits in 1978.
One can legitimately question whether a court that keeps up with
its docket should be thus penalized.
c. Automatic Mechanisms
Rather than giving some body authority to assign cases among
the available circuits, Congress could provide an automatic, non-
discretionary mechanism for assigning cases in which multiple peti-
tions have been filed in the same manner that judges are assigned
to panels within the circuits.312  In choosing an automatic mecha-
nism, Congress would need only ensure that its outcomes were not
predictable. A simple lottery would probably be the easiest auto-
matic mechanism, or a neutral assigning body, such as the Adminis-
309 Justice Department Proposal, supra note 278, at 3; Ross Proposal 1, supra
note 278.
310 AO RzroaT, supra note 253, at 45, table 3.
3111d.
3 12 See Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d 1270, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Lotteries are used for a number of important decisions where more appro-
priate criteria are elusive, such as the draft for induction into military service, see
United States v. Kotrlik, 465 F.2d 976 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043
(1972), and the assignment of public housing, see Holmes v. New York City
Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968). The Federal Communica-
tions Commisison has recently instructed its staff to draft a proposed opinion for
assigning by lottery a broadcast license between two licensees that are otherwise
"'equally qualified." See Broadcasting, June 9, 1980, at 30, col. 1.
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trative Office of the United States Courts, could assign cases in some
other random fashion.
An automatic mechanism would avoid costly courthouse races,
eliminate the need for costly threshold discretionary transfer litiga-
tion,313 and satisfy most conceptions of fairness. No party would
have any particular advantage, because the choice would be utterly
impartial.314 The starting-pistol problems of section 2112(a) prac-
tice would similarly disappear, because all parties would have until
the end of a predetermined period to file petitions for review. This
should also encourage parties to file thorough petitions for review
rather than the prefabricated skeletal outlines that are typical in
races to the courthouse. 15 Although the public might be unfavor-
ably impressed by a system which necessitates a lottery or random
schedule to allocate cases among presumably neutral forums, the
automatic mechanism would virtually eliminate section 2112(a)'s
potential for drawing sustained public ridicule. At the same time
an automatic mechanism would preserve judicial comity, because
the mechanism would avoid any possibility that two courts would
be required to decide the same question in the same case. Finally,
an automatic mechanism would preserve the percolation and sig-
naling benefits of forum shopping.
Like all forum-allocating mechanisms, the automatic mecha-
nism has its disadvantages, including its failure to encourage uni-
form application of agency-administered laws and its propensity to
perpetuate business uncertainty. The agency and affected busi-
nesses can similarly never know in advance how deferential the
reviewing court is likely to be toward the agency's factual findings
and policy-dominated inferences. To a large extent, however, these
disadvantages are an inevitable trade-off that must be suffered in
a system that merely controls rather than eliminates forum shop-
ping.
The "pure" automatic mechanism proposal is likely to prove
unattractive to many lawyers because of its inherent inflexibility.
In order to ensure a properly functioning "pure" automatic
mechanism Congress would have to take away from the courts the
power to transfer a case once the mechanism had assigned the case
to that court. Although it is difficult to imagine a case in which
313 Cf. Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 100 S. Ct 1779, 1783 n.13 (1980) (arguing
that it is more important to have a rule that avoids threshold litigation than it is
to have a less arbitrary procedure).
314See G. CAIx siisr & P. BoBBrrr, TRAGIc CHOICES 41-44 (1977); Fels,
supra note 85, at 50-51.
315 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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this inflexibility could prove to be inefficient or unfair, the mecha-
nism makes no allowance for such cases. If some flexibility is de-
sired, Congress could retain the flexibility of the existing system
-while eliminating most of its unsavory aspects-by allowing the
court to which a case is originally assigned to transfer to any other
court "in the interest of justice for the convenience of the parties."
This proposal would merely eliminate the race; forum shopping
could still occur at the discretionary transfer stage.
The obvious disadvantage of this "hybrid" automatic/discre-
tionary model is its propensity to encourage wasteful threshold
litigation over discretionary transfer. The previous analysis of the
courts' experience in implementing section 2112(a)'s discretionary
transfer provision indicates that the transfer criteria rarely point to
a single court in a given case. Yet as long as the courts remain
relatively generous in granting motions to transfer, the parties to
administrative appeals will have an incentive to litigate that ques-
tion, however inefficient that process might be from an overall
societal perspective. Congress might well decide that the costs of
this round of threshold litigation outweigh any capacity it might
have for preserving fairness in those rare cases in which justice and
convenience clearly point to a single court.316
310 Even if Congress adopted the "pure" automatic assignment mechanism, it
might desire to retain sufficient flexibility to deal with the "same order" problem.
See notes 128-49 supra & accompanying text. If all petitions from a given order
are determined by an automatic mechanism, then there would appear to be no
discretion to allow a single court to decide questions involving simultaneous or
successive orders that are in fact the "same order." This defect could be eliminated
by giving some body jurisdiction to order consolidation under the "same or inter-
related proceedings" rule. See text accompanying notes 184-88 supra. The ideal
body to make this determination is the agency, because it is familiar with its pro-
cedures and with the details of the proceedings from which appeals are taken.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts could be required to deter-
mine intercircuit petitions by an automatic mechanism except in cases in which the
agency certified to the Administrative Office that several orders simultaneously issued
were in fact the "same order," in which case the Administrative Office would con-
solidate all of the petitions and send them to a single circuit. For successive orders,
the Administrative Office could be instructed to transfer to the court in which the
agency determined that the "same order" is being decided.
Because this suggestion for resolving the "same order" problem appears to
allow the agency to engage in formn shopping, see text following note 248 supra,
it may not be politically feasible to enact a statute that provides for consolidation
of cases involving the same order by any body of lesser status than a court. The
proposal might therefore be modified to require the court receiving the second of
two allegedly successive orders to transfer to the court currently hearing the first
such order under the stringent "same or interrelated proceedings" rule. See notes
184-88 supra & accompanying text. A stringent rule would be required to prevent
undue threshold litigation over whether two successive orders were in fact the
"same order." In no case should transfer be allowed when the first court has
already decided the first case, because such transfer would of necessity recognize
a theory of specialized tribunals that Congress, in adopting the automatic meeha-
nisn, must have rejected. Finally, the Administrative Office could consolidate all
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Another problem that proposals for an automatic mechanism
must address is the timing of the mechanism and the related ques-
tion of the issuance of stays of administrative action pending re-
view on the merits. 317  Congress could, of course, essentially
eliminate the stay problem by mandating that the Administrative
Office choose a forum for the merits within twenty-four hours of
the filing of the first petition for review. Because stays are rarely
necessary within a day after the agency action, this would in effect
assign the stay decision to the court that hears the merits.318 For
the extremely rare case in which a stay is necessary within twenty-
four hours any court of appeals in which a petition was filed could
retain jurisdiction to issue twenty-four hour stays pending assign-
ment of the case.
The difficulty with the twenty-four hour assignment is the fact
that the case could be assigned before all potential litigants would
normally be aware of the fact that the agency had acted. To
avoid missing the deadline parties would still have to employ para-
legals to stalk the Federal Register Office,3 19 and lawyers would still
be required to file hastily drafted petitions as rapidly as possible.
There would thus be a race, but it would be more in the nature
of a qualifying heat.
Congress could alternatively provide sufficient time (approxi-
mately ten days) for all potential litigants to receive notice of the
agency's action before the case would be assigned to a particular
circuit. This proposal, however, reintroduces the requirement that
some body be vested with authority to issue emergency stays.
320
appeals from simultaneous orders and assign them to a single court which would
then be required to refer back to that Office for reassignment those orders that
were not, according to the court, the "same order." Again, the courts should be
encouraged to be niggardly in referring matters back to the Administrative Office
so as to discourage threshold litigation.
In the final analysis, the relatively rare cases in which the "same order" ques-
tion arises may not warrant this much intrusion into the automatic assignment
process.
31 7 See notes 201-04 supra & accompanying text.
3 18 All parties that filed timely petitions would, of course, be allowed to par-
ticipate in the appeal. The 24-hour cut-off would merely limit the possible forums
to those in which petitions had been filed within that time limit.
319 See text accompanying note 104 supra.
320 This alternative would also hinder the not atypical practice of ordering
expedited briefing schedules for the merits of the case after stays have been issued,
because the court issuing the stay would not necessarily be the court deciding the
merits. However, the court deciding the merits could just as easily order an ex-
pedited briefing schedule. The eight or nine days lost awaiting assignment of the
case should not seriously interfere with an expeditious resolution of the merits. In
any event, if 10 days are needed to give notice to all potential litigants, a briefing
schedule that penalized those parties that did not petition for review within that
time period would seem fundamentally unfair.
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If such authority were granted to the court in which the party
seeking the stay filed its petition, a race to the stay-issuing court,
with all its attendant disadvantages, would be the likely result.
This residual race could be eliminated in one of two ways.
The administrative agency could state that its order did not become
effective until after the court of review has been assigned.321 This
would eliminate entirely the rationale for the race. Alternatively,
Congress could vest jurisdiction for issuing temporary stays in the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals,322 and mandate that any
stays thereby granted automatically dissolve within a few days after
the circuit of review has been assigned. Although utilizing the Tem-
porary Emergency Court of Appeals in this manner may increase liti-
gant and judicial costs by requiring the litigation of two temporary
stays, there would still be marked cost savings overall. Not only is it
unlikely that the fight for and against the second stay would re-
quire much extra effort,323 but the single most costly component
of the struggle-the race and its attendant litigation-would be
eliminated.
Finally, the automatic system does not preclude the possibility
of forum shopping to avoid a particular circuit. This problem
seems ultimately unsolvable. In the energy area in particular, at-
torneys representing producers appear to be more concerned with
avoiding the District of Columbia Circuit than with locating their
appeals in any one of the other circuits. 32 4 A large multi-state cor-
poration could under many venue statutes substantially increase
its chances of avoiding a particular court by filing petitions in all
of the other circuits. In any given case the probability of the case
being heard in the circuit that it sought to avoid would be only
one-in-eleven. This might be perceived as an unfair advantage to
the large corporation that can file petitions in many circuits. Con-
gress could reduce the impact of this ploy somewhat by providing
that a single petitioner could file only one petition for review, but
this rule could easily be circumvented in the typical rulemaking
proceeding in which numerous parties are lined up on either side
of a given issue.
321 For instance, the recently promulgated EPA race regulations state that an
order is not "promulgated" until two weeks after its publication in the Federal
Register. See Final EPA Race Regulations, supra note 17, at 26,046.
322 See generally 17 WmaGrr & Mnr.Tm., supra note 4, at § 4105; Nathanson,
supra note 250, at 1009-12.
323 See note 320 supra.
324 Confidential communications to the author. See note 42 supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The author readily admits that the proposal espoused here,
an automatic mechanism for the assignment of agency appeals, will
be resisted despite its apparent fairness and simplicity. The idea
of such a mechanism runs directly against the lawyer's deeply in-
grained weltanschauung, the notion that every question has a cor-
rect answer that can best be reached through adversial procedures.
The burden in this case, however, should be upon those who, per-
haps self-servingly, argue that large amounts of society's limited
resources should be devoted to the essentially trivial question of
which of two co-equal courts shall hear a particular appeal. While
the automatic mechanism in some rare cases may work a hardship
upon one who cannot afford to send a lawyer to a distant appellate
court, that relatively minor disadvantage is more than offset by the
vast amount of legal energy that can be conserved by the simple
roll of a die.
